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REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIALMARKET REGULATOR
Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss*
Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors,
news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated,
and reported on the role that residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) played in the 2008 financial crisis. Big banks create RMBS by
pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts.
Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment
of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should
play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.
This article examines federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note
pools formed in the years leading up to the financial crisis. Tax law
provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment
conduits (REMICs), a type of RMBS pool. To qualify for the favorable
REMIC tax treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements
relating to the ownership and quality of mortgage notes. The practices of
loan originators and RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the
financial crisis have jeopardized the tax classification of a significant
portion of the RMBS pools. Nonetheless, the IRS appears to believe that
there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC classification of
even the worst RMBS pools. This article takes issue with the IRS’s
inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax
law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of
RMBS pools. The article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its
failure to police these arrangements prior to the financial crisis is partly to
blame for the economic meltdown in 2008. The IRS’s continued failure to
police RMBS arrangements provides latitude to industry participants to
facilitate future economic catastrophes. Even where the IRS does not take
action, private parties can rely upon the blueprint set forth in the article to
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bring qui tam or whistleblower claims to accomplish the purposes of the
REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial results that would occur if the IRS
enforced the REMIC rules.
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INTRODUCTION

When real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) operate
in the Congressionally-sanctioned manner, they drive capital to residential
real estate markets and help provide liquidity to all classes of homeowners.
That capital makes homeownership a reality for people who may not
otherwise be able to purchase a home. It also fuels economic growth.
Unfortunately, in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, REMIC
sponsors disregarded Congressional mandates, labeling unqualified

BORDEN AND REISS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT

6/3/14 10:03 AM

665

arrangements as “REMICs.”
REMIC organizers (including loan
originators, underwriters, and sponsors) knowingly originated and pooled
problematic mortgage notes to form residential-mortgage backed securities
(RMBS).
RMBS pools thus included mortgage notes signed by
uninformed and unqualified borrowers with insufficient collateral to ensure
repayment. Having established these purported REMICs, the organizers
then misrepresented their quality to investors.
REMIC organizers’ practices were an integral part of the financial
debacle that brought the multi-trillion dollar real estate finance industry to
its knees. In fact, the practices literally brought the U.S. Treasury to its
knees as Secretary Hank Paulson pled with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to
keep her party on board with the 2008 federal government bailout designed
to address the financial crisis.1 REMIC organizers’ practices also crippled
the world economy. If the IRS had enforced the REMIC rules, it would
have deterred the unsavory practices of REMIC organizers, which most
likely would have helped prevent or at least reduce the magnitude of the
financial crisis. Now the IRS must take action and collect the revenues to
which the government is legally entitled.
REMICs are the result of mortgage securitization—the process of
pooling illiquid assets, such as mortgage notes, into an RMBS pool (often
structured as a state-law trust) and selling securities in the pool to investors.
The securitization process requires several steps. Loan originators such as
local banks lend money in exchange for mortgage notes and mortgages.
They then sell the mortgage notes and mortgages to an RMBS sponsor.
The RMBS sponsor gathers hundreds of mortgage notes and mortgages
from loan originators and transfers them to an RMBS trust in exchange for
interests in the trust. The sponsor then sells the RMBS to investors. If an
RMBS trust satisfies several requirements, it will qualify as a REMIC and
receive favorable tax treatment.2
Congress designed the REMIC requirements to ensure that only
high-quality mortgage notes enter RMBS pools that seek REMIC
classification. By failing to securitize only high-quality mortgage notes in
REMICs, RMBS sponsors violated tax law on a wide scale. The IRS
would have uncovered such violations if it had audited REMICs. Early
detection of violations through tax enforcement would have deterred much
of the behavior that is responsible for the financial crisis. The IRS’s failure
1. Liz Wolgemuth, Hank Paulson: Kneeling Before Pelosi, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 26, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-inside-job/2008/09/26/hankpaulson-kneeling-before-pelosi (explaining that “Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson
reportedly kneeled before House Speaker Nancy Pelosi last night in a bid to keep her party
on board with the bailout package.”).
2. See infra Part II (explaining the requirements under the I.R.C. to become an
REMIC).
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to audit REMICs and enforce the REMIC rules thus allowed practices to
deteriorate and helped to cause the financial crisis. The IRS should now
take action by challenging the classification of at least certain types of
REMICs. Such actions would add to government revenues, put mortgage
securitizers on notice that they must comply with congressional mandates,
reestablish the IRS’s role as an impartial enforcer of federal tax statutes,
and guide the tax bar as it advises financial institutions about the
requirements for REMICs.
The significant amount of litigation that followed the RMBS
collapse has exposed a number of unsavory lending and securitization
practices that led to the financial crisis.3 In these legal battles, banks and
RMBS sponsors have found themselves in the crosshairs of not only RMBS
investors and government agencies but also homeowners. Homeowners
and borrowers fight foreclosure and bankruptcy claims in downstream
litigation; RMBS investors and prosecutors sue RMBS sponsors in
upstream litigation.4 In downstream litigation, homeowners challenge
claims of parties who attempt to foreclose on property or bring a claim in
bankruptcy. The results of downstream RMBS litigation are mixed both
from a legal and contextual perspective. In some jurisdictions, courts rule
in favor of homeowners and estop purported mortgage holders from
foreclosing on property or participating in bankruptcy proceedings.5 In
other jurisdictions, courts allow purported mortgage holders to proceed
with foreclosures or participate in bankruptcy proceedings.6 States have
also filed lawsuits against lenders and other financial institutions in the
mortgage industry claiming unfair and otherwise inappropriate lending and
foreclosure practices.7 The results of some of these actions appear in
headlines reporting settlements between states and financial institutions

3. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT (2011) (breaking down the official government report of the financial
crisis); see also John M. Griffin & Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in
Securitized Loans? (Working Paper, Dec. 20, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256060
(examining prevalence of four misrepresentation indicators in private-label RMBS).
4. REFINBLOG, http://refinblog.com (presenting and summarizing both downstream
and upstream litigation matters).
5. See id. (reviewing the current landscape in upstream and downstream litigation).
6. See id. (recognizing the different treatment of litigation in jurisdictions).
7. See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, No. 451556/2012
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Oct. 10, 2012) (filing by New York Attorney General against J.P.
Morgan for fraudulent and deceptive acts in promoting and selling MBS); Press Release,
Lender Processing Services, Inc., Lender Processing Services Announces Multi-State
Attorneys General Settlement; Significant Civil Litigation Also Resolved (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/lender-processing-services-announces-multi140000279.html (announcing settlement over robo-signing allegations “with the attorneys
general of 46 states and the District of Columbia”).
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that total many billions of dollars.8
In upstream RMBS litigation, RMBS investors sue for various
types of wrongdoing on the part of financial institutions. Investors claim
that financial institutions did not properly disclose their liability exposure,
that mortgage securitizations did not proceed as represented in offering
materials and required by pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs), and
that RMBS sponsors misrepresented facts about the ownership and quality
of pooled mortgages.9 Much of the upstream litigation is in its early stages
but involves astronomical sums of money. Figure 1 summarizes the
litigation landscape in this area.

The financial crisis has been written about from many angles, but
this article is the first to approach it from the perspective of tax policy. It
illustrates that law and policy do not support REMIC classification of
numerous RMBS pools. The article suggests that had the IRS enforced
statutory requirements for REMICs, it could have helped prevent the
financial crisis. After analyzing multiple questions of first impression that
the courts will face in resolving RMBS litigation, this article concludes that
even today the IRS could and should take action against REMICs that
clearly violate the REMIC rules.

8. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, States Negotiate $26 Billion
Agreement for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A1.
9. See infra Part I.D (citing examples of upstream litigation regarding the
misrepresentations made by RMBS sponsors).
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Part I of the article recounts the history of the RMBS industry and
the role of REMIC classification in that industry. The discussion reveals
that policymakers and commentators support mortgage-note securitization
because it provides greater liquidity to residential mortgage lenders,
reduces the cost of borrowing, and makes homeownership available to a
broader cross-section of the population. Congress enacted the REMIC
rules to facilitate mortgage securitization by providing tax-favored
treatment to RMBS structures that satisfied several requirements. That
favorable treatment was tailored to RMBS structures and securitization
processes that were common at the time. Following the enactment of the
REMIC rules, however, lending and securitization practices began to
change. Leading up to the financial crisis, those practices ceased to satisfy
the applicable requirements.
Part II provides the legal basis for challenging the REMIC
classification of many RMBS arrangements. Comparing the rules of
REMIC classification to actual securitization practices in the years leading
up to the financial crisis reveals that many RMBS arrangements that held
themselves out as REMICs could not satisfy the REMIC requirements.
This analysis discredits claims of commentators and government officials
who argue that there are no good legal or policy reasons for challenging the
tax classification of purported REMICs.10
Part III presents the policy reasons for challenging REMIC
classification. Congress enacted the REMIC rules to apply to a very
specific type of mortgage-note pool. The requirements are grounded in
sound tax policy and the IRS should be duty-bound to enforce the rules.
Granting favorable tax treatment to RMBS arrangements that fail to adhere
to those rules undermines Congressional intent and the sound policy that
supports the rules. Failure to enforce the rules has allowed parties to
siphon significant tax revenue from government coffers. The failure to
audit purported REMICs has also empowered REMIC organizers to engage
in practices that led to the financial crisis. Continued failure to act in this
area will provide continued opportunities for such practices. IRS inaction
also justifies the tax bar’s poor work in this area, making the call to action
all the more urgent. The IRS has an obligation to act to thwart the type of
behavior that brought the world economy to its knees.

10. See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Dirt Lawyers Versus Wall Street: A Different View, 27
PROB. & PROP. MAG. 6 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property_magazine_2012/2013/november
_december_2013/letters_to_the_editor.html (showing the need to challenge the tax
classifications and the benefits of doing so); John W. Rogers III, Tax Issues Involving
Flawed Securitizations, Sales, Exchanges & Basis Committee Meeting, A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N
(Orlando), Jan. 26, 2013.
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OVERVIEW OF RMBS INDUSTRY AND ROLE OF REMICS

For generations, Americans who wanted to buy a home would
typically contact a local thrift institution, like a savings and loan or bank,
and speak to a loan officer who would evaluate their applications.11 Under
those conditions, reserve requirements and balance sheet restrictions
limited the amount of money institutions could lend.12 The system stifled
growth by limiting the amount of cash available to lend to potential
homeowners.13 Limited amounts of cash drove up interest rates, making
homeownership available only to people with prime financial profiles.14
Thus, traditional financing practice needed innovation to make home
ownership possible for a larger segment of society. The solution appeared
to lie with Wall Street.
A.

Origins of the RMBS Market

Wall Street investors historically viewed home loans as riskier
investments than other assets because mortgages are regulated by a
patchwork of local and state laws and are tied to local economies.15 A local
recession or natural disaster could increase defaults and decrease the value
of a portfolio of geographically concentrated mortgages. These conditions
kept Wall Street investors out of the residential mortgage market. To help
create more liquidity for lenders and homebuyers, the federal government
began considering mortgage securitization as a possible source of greater
liquidity in the late 1960s.16 Securitizations were carefully structured to
achieve precise tax, accounting, and regulatory treatment to make them
attractive to Wall Street investors. To help reduce risks associated with
local economies, the pool of mortgages were drawn from diverse

11. David J. Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 992-93
(2005).
12. See generally Jerome F. Festa, Introduction to PATRICK D. DOLAN & C. VANLEER
DAVIS III, SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL & REGULATORY ISSUES 1-1 (2013) (discussing the
evolution of securitization).
13. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION, § 1.2 (3d ed.) (describing “capital shortage” and the need for
“alternative capital streams”).
14. Reiss, supra note11, at 992-93.
15. See id. at 1001, for a discussion of the history of RMBS.
16. Then-Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney championed the
mortgage securitization movement. John C. Weicher, Setting GSE Policy through Charters,
Laws, and Regulations, in SERVING TWO MASTERS, YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND
FREDDIE MAC 120, 131-32 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2001).
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locations.17 Interests in these pools of mortgages were dubbed residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
The most important factor in the development of the RMBS market
was the creation of two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs): Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae created a secondary market for certain
loans prior to 1970, but the RMBS market began in earnest with the
passage of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (EHFA), which
allowed GSEs to purchase and securitize conforming mortgages. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac set up standardized procedures for the creation and
management of RMBS pools, and guaranteed the timely payment of
principal and interest on the securities backed by the loans in the pool.18
GSEs only securitized conforming loans—those meeting strict standards
related to the borrower’s creditworthiness and the value of the collateral.19
Securitizations in the 1970s involved direct pass-through securities
for which investors received a mortgage-note pool’s cash flow in
proportion to their ownership of securities in the pool.20 Thus, a person
who owned five percent of the pool’s securities would receive five percent
of the cash flow from each mortgage and be taxed accordingly. In the late
1970s, “the primary condition” necessary for the explosion of RMBS
securitization came about: “a funding shortfall.”21 That is, the strong desire
for home ownership and the rapid escalation of housing prices created a
demand for residential mortgages that the local lending institutions could
not meet. Wall Street firms responded.
Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, issuers unrelated to the
federal government, such as commercial banks and mortgage companies,
began to issue RMBS. These “private label” securities did not have the
governmental or quasi-governmental guarantee that a federally-related
issuer such as a GSE would give, and they are typically backed by
nonconforming loans. Private-label securitization gained momentum
during the savings and loan crisis in the early 1980s. Wall Street firms
identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis by proffering

17. Reiss, supra note11, at 1004.
18. David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1073
(2008).
19. See id. at 1032 (outlining the standards that must be met to qualify as a conforming
loan).
20. See JOHN FRANCIS HILSON & JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING, § 2:6.2 (2000) (presenting different forms of
funding practices used by vehicles to purchase or finance receivables, including passthrough funding).
21. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 1, 6 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
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the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the thrifts’ residential
portfolio dilemma.”22 Issuers of these private-label securities were less
regulated and less consistent than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it
came to creating and managing their products. Nonetheless, private-label
RMBS faced a serious impediment to their growth that arose from their tax
treatment.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the tax classification and
treatment of the mortgage-note pools stymied the growth of the RMBS
industry.
RMBS sponsors could structure mortgage-note pools as
investment trusts, which required the pools to remain constant and the
investors to have interests in the underlying mortgages that were
proportionate to their interests in the trust.23 Consequently, the trust
generally could issue only one class or type of security.24 If the RMBS
pool was an investment trust, the interest income from the loans would
flow through to the investors without the trust incurring any tax liability.25
The proportionate ownership requirement, however, prohibited the RMBS
pool from issuing different classes (or tranches) of interests without
becoming a taxable entity.26 Thus, RMBS sponsors had to choose between
a single-tranche flow-through mortgage pool and a multiple-tranche taxable
mortgage-pool.
Leaving the tax drawbacks aside, the financial benefits of multipletranche mortgage-note pools are significant. A multiple-tranche mortgagenote pool creates RMBS interests with different risk profiles. For instance,
the mortgage-note pool over-collateralizes the highest-rated tranche and
pays the holders of that tranche first. If the trust has sufficient proceeds, it
pays the holders of all of the tranches. If borrowers begin to default,
however, the trust may not be able to fully pay the obligations of all the
tranches. Thus, the lower-rated tranches are riskier and pay a higher
interest rate. The ability to provide tranches with different risk profiles
makes RMBS attractive to a broader swathe of investors and adds more
capital to the residential mortgage market. And most importantly, if rating
agencies rate the least risky tranches in a multiple-tranche pool as

22. Id.
23. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (as amended in 1996) (defining investment
trusts).
24. Id.
25. I.R.C. §§ 671–679 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(e)(1), (3) (2013); see I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 34,347 (Sept. 14, 1970) (demonstrating that tax law treats investment trusts as
grantor trusts).
26. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 407 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook].
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“investment-grade,” those tranches can be eligible for purchase by a range
of institutional investors.27
As noted, the problem with the multiple-tranche RMBS structure in
the 1970s and 1980s was that it would not qualify for flow-through
taxation.28 Consequently, a multiple-tranche RMBS trust would have been
treated as a taxable corporation and subject to tax on interest earned on
loans;29 interests in such a trust might have been equity and not debt, so
payments to holders might not have been deductible,30 and RMBS holders
would have had to pay tax on payments that they received.31 Thus, the tax
aspects of multiple-tranche RMBS structures made them unattractive to
investors.
Congress was concerned about granting favorable tax treatment to
multiple-tranche RMBS structures because the cash inflows and outflows
and the interest income and deductions of such structures do not match.32
Because the risk profile and date to maturity of the tranches vary, the
interest rate for the tranches varies, and the RMBS trust and RMBS
investors recognize interest income at different times under the rules
governing original issue discount.33 Even if the income of RMBS holders
and the RMBS trust equalized over time, that durational difference could
deprive the federal government of the time-value-of-money related to the
delayed tax payments on the interest income of the junior tranche
investors.34 Congress needed to solve this delay problem before it would
grant flow-through treatment to multiple-tranche RMBS trusts.

27. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS (2011),
available at http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf
(discussing the relationship between credit ratings and tranches).
28. 1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 407; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (as
amended in 1996) (stating that “[a]n ‘investment’ trust will not be classified as a trust if
there is a power under the trust agreement to vary the investment of the certificate
holders. . . . An investment trust with multiple classes of ownership interests ordinarily will
be classified as a [corporation].”).
29. See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2012) (imposing a tax on corporate income).
30. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012) (allowing a deduction for interest payment, but no
similar deduction exists for dividend payments).
31. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2012) (stating that income from dividends contributes to
gross income).
32. 1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 411-12; see Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of
REMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 149, 154–156 (1994) (describing the mismatch
between cash flows and taxes).
33. See Van Brunt, supra note 32, at 211–18 (explaining why investors recognize
interest income at different times).
34. See id. at 154–56, 184–85 (describing the timing difference).
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Congress solved the problem with the REMIC rules by providing
that REMICs must have only regular interests and residual interests.35 The
regular interest holders had to recognize interest income under the accrual
method, taking into account any original issue discount in their interests.36
The residual interest holders, on the other hand, had to recognize an
amount of income (or loss) necessary to account for income not recognized
by the regular interest holders, known as phantom income (or loss).37 The
holders of residual interests generally recognized phantom income early in
the life of the RMBS trust and phantom loss in the later years.38 Even if the
income and loss offset each other, the timing difference gave residual
interests negative value.39 To account for that income, an RMBS trust had
to compute and estimate the performance of the loans on the formation of
the RMBS trust, and the trust assets had to remain static throughout the life
of the trust to give such computations and estimations meaning.40 Figure 2,
below, illustrates why the interest of the RMBS trust does not match
interest income of the RMBS investors.

35. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 412 (noting that “[h]olders of ‘regular
interests’ generally take into income that portion of the income of the REMIC that would be
recognized by an accrual method holder of a debt instrument that had the same terms as the
particular regular interest; holders of ‘residual interests’ take into account all of the net
income of the REMIC that is not taken into account by the holders of the regular interests”);
Bruce Kayle, Where Has All the Income Gone? The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and
Principal in Coupon Stripping and Related Transactions, 7 VA. TAX REV. 303, 348 (1987)
(providing that “[h]olders of residual interests take into account the difference between the
income generated by the REMIC’s assets and the amount of income taken into account by
the holders of regular interests”).
36. See I.R.C § 860B(b) (2012) (requiring the use of the accrual method); I.R.C §
1272(a)(6) (2012) (applying special accrual rules to regular interest investors).
37. See I.R.C. §§ 860C(a), 860E(a) (2012) (requiring that the residual interest holder’s
income be no less than the excess inclusion [“phantom income”] for the year).
38. See Van Brunt, supra note 32, at 211-14.
39. Id. at 203.
40. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6)(A) (2012) (providing that the daily accruals would derive
in part from the present value of remaining payments under a debt instrument—either the
RMBS or the mortgage note); Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(d)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2013) (requiring a
REMIC to report the following on the tax return for its first taxable year: information about
the terms and conditions of the regular and residual interests and a description about the
prepayment and reinvestment assumptions that the REMIC uses for purposes of I.R.C. §
1272); see also 1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 426 ( “Congress intended that such
prepayment assumption will be determined by the assumed rate of prepayments on qualified
mortgages held by the REMIC and also the assumed rate of earnings on the temporary
investment of payments on such mortgages insofar as such rate of earnings would affect the
timing of payments on regular interests. The Congress intended that the Treasury
regulations will require these pricing assumptions to be specified in the first partnership
return filed by the REMIC.”).
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As part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress provided that
RMBS trusts that account for phantom income and loss are not subject to
corporate taxation, but qualify for flow-through taxation.41 The static-asset
requirement goes beyond merely limiting the transfer of mortgage notes
into and out of an RMBS trust. It also supports a fairly accurate assessment
of the value of the mortgage notes in a pool and the likelihood that
borrowers will make timely payments on their loans. Factors such as the
borrower’s creditworthiness, the value of the borrower’s collateral, the
occupancy status of the collateral, and the trust’s right and ability to
foreclose on the collateral affect the value of the mortgage notes in a given
pool and the likelihood and timeliness of payments.42 Consequently,
Congress imposed strict trust asset requirements that multiple-tranche
RMBS trusts must satisfy in order to qualify for REMIC flow-through
treatment.43 RMBS trusts that fail to satisfy these requirements cannot
accurately compute the income of the RMBS holders and can thereby
siphon revenues from government coffers by using REMIC flow-through

41. See I.R.C. § 860A (2012) (describing the taxation of REMICs).
42. See e.g., Griffin & Maturana, supra note 3 (identifying the negative impact on
payments of unreported second liens, inflated appraisals, misrepresentation of owner
occupancy, and flipping); State-Level Guarantee Fee Pricing, 77 Fed. Reg. 58991, 58991
(proposed Sept. 25, 2012) (noting “the exceptionally high costs” incurred “in cases of
mortgage default in [certain] states”).
43. See I.R.C. §§ 860D, 860G (2012) (defining a REMIC); see also infra Part III.
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taxation.44 Consequently, any RMBS trust that neither meets the REMIC
requirements nor is an investment trust must be taxed as a corporation.45
Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, multiple-tranche
mortgage-note pools could take the favored tax status of a REMIC if they
satisfied the REMIC requirements. At the time Congress created the
REMIC rules, RMBS sponsors appeared to take appropriate measures to
ensure that they had satisfied the REMIC requirements. REMIC status
revolutionized the RMBS industry. Between 1986 and 2008, REMICs
became a significant part of the RMBS market. As of the end of 2011,
purported REMICs held more than $3 trillion in assets.46 That value was
about a quarter of all U.S. residential mortgages and a third of all
securitized mortgages.47
A simplified version of the securitization process in 1986 illustrates
how mortgage notes and mortgages moved to REMICs at the time
Congress created the REMIC rules. First, an originator lent money to a
borrower. The borrower signed a mortgage note for the amount of the loan
and a mortgage granting the lender a security interest in the loan. As part
of this step, the lender recorded the mortgage with the county clerk.48
Second, the originator entered into a PSA with a sponsor and trustee.
Pursuant to the agreement, the originator sold the mortgage note and
mortgage to a REMIC sponsor for cash.49 If the mortgage note was a
bearer instrument, the originator transferred it by transferring possession of
the mortgage note; otherwise, the originator endorsed the note and
transferred possession of it.50 As part of the second step, the REMIC
44. Miscalculations may result in understated phantom income of the residual interest
holders. This could occur if the fair market value of the mortgage notes in the pool is less
than the value that the RMBS organizers claim it is. The overstated value would cause the
trust to report less gross income than otherwise required under the rules governing original
issue discount. That underreporting would understate the amount of phantom income that
the residual interest holders would report in the early years of the RMBS.
45. See I.R.C. § 7701(i) (2012) (treating taxable mortgage pools as tax corporations);
1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 411 (stating that “[t]he Congress believed that this vehicle
should be the exclusive vehicle (accompanied by exclusive tax consequences) relating to the
issuance of multiple class mortgage-back securities, and that availability of other vehicles
should be limited to the extent possible.”).
46. Amended Complaint at 36, Knights of Columbus v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No.
651442/2011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 16, 2011) (citing Scot J. Paltrow, IRS Weighs Tax
Penalties on Mortgage Securities, REUTERS, Apr. 27, 2011, http://reut.rs/kPqOnE).
47. See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage
Debt Outstanding, 1990-2010, FHFA.GOV, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70
(providing residential mortgage data in the United States).
48. See generally 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.28 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2013) (describing the mortgage priority rules).
49. See Reiss, supra note 11, at 1003 (describing the securitization process).
50. See WOLF, supra note 48, § 37.27 (describing the transferability of the interests of
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sponsor recorded the transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.51 Third,
after the REMIC sponsor acquired a pool of mortgage notes and mortgages,
it transferred them to a REMIC trust in exchange for the beneficial interests
in the trust.52 The REMIC trust had no managers, so its trustee recorded the
transfer of the mortgage note and mortgages with the county clerk.53
Fourth, the sponsor sold the beneficial interests in the REMIC trust to
investors.54 Figure 3 illustrates the traditional RMBS securitization process
from its inception in the 1970s until the 1990s.

the mortgagee).
51. See id.
52. See PATRICK D. DOLAN & C. VANLEER DAVIS III, SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL &
REGULATORY ISSUES § 4.02 (providing a short description of the typical structure of
securitization trusts).
53. See JASON H.P. KRAVITT, SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 9.02 (2012)
(describing the duties of the trustee in order to comply with securitization transaction
requirements).
54. See DOLAN & DAVIS, supra note 52, § 4.02[2d-f] (discussing the tax issues of
securitization).
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Mortgage Securitization with MERS

The process of assigning mortgages was universally cumbersome
until the end of the twentieth century. Each assignment from originator to
sponsor or from sponsor to mortgage-note pool was recorded in the local
land records where the property securing the mortgage loan was located. In
the 1990s, industry players including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the
Mortgage Bankers Association sought to streamline the process of
assigning mortgages from the originator to the mortgage-note pool.55 They
attempted to accomplish this purpose by forming The Mortgage Electronic
Recording System (MERS), which was up and running by the late 1990s.56
The stated purpose of MERS is to reduce the cost and administrative
inconvenience of recording mortgage assignments.57 Members of MERS
attempt to accomplish this purpose by naming MERS as nominee of the
originator, then trading and recording assignments internally without
needing to record each assignment in the local land records.58 A MERS
mortgage contains a statement that says, in substance, “MERS is a separate
corporation that is acting solely as nominee for the Lender and Lender’s
successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this Security
Instrument.”59 MERS is not named on any note endorsement. This new
system was designed to save lenders a small but not insignificant amount of
money in the form of recording fees every time a mortgage was transferred.
Unfortunately, MERS’s legal status was not clear and it had not been
ratified by Congress or by state legislatures, save for a few, and the concept
did not receive proper vetting from all affected constituents.60 Nonetheless,
nearly all the major mortgage originators and RMBS sponsors participated
in MERS. As of 2012, MERS stated that more than “74 million mortgages
have been recorded in the name of MERS Inc., of which 27 million are
currently active.”61

55. Patrick C. Sargent & Mark W. Harris, The Myths and Merits of MERS (Sept. 25,
2012), ANDREWS KURTH LLP, n.1 http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications926.pdf (identifying the parties responsible for changing the mortgage assigning process).
56. Id., at 1 (detailing how the MERS-sanctioned account was created).
57. Id. (explaining the reasons for creating MERS).
58. See id. (describing how the MERS system does not usurp the function of local
recording officials to track changes in ownership of real property).
59. See, e.g., Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Authorized
Changes for MERS 1 (2012), available at
www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/unifmersauth.doc (last visited August 1, 2013).
60. Minnesota enacted a “MERS Statute” that allowed nominees like MERS to record
an “assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.” Minn. Stat. §
507.413 (2013).
61. Sargent & Harris, supra note 55, at 10.
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A MERS-facilitated securitization originally occurred as follows:
first, a person borrowed from a loan originator, executed a note to the
originator, and granted the originator a mortgage in the property securing
the loan. Second, the originator recorded the mortgage in the local
recording office, naming MERS as nominee. Third, the originator assigned
its rights in the mortgage note and mortgage and transferred them to an
RMBS sponsor, and MERS recorded the assignment. Fourth, the sponsor
assigned the mortgage note and mortgage and transferred them to the
RMBS trustee, and MERS recorded the assignment. Fifth, MERS updated
its database to reflect the transfer of the mortgage to the sponsor and
RMBS trustee. Figure 4 illustrates the MERS-facilitated securitization
process as originally conceived and executed. The industry used this
process from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s.62

During this period, RMBS sponsors became more sophisticated
and providers diversified the types of loans they offered, so RMBS
sponsors expanded the types of RMBS that they offered. Such specialized
mortgage-note pools included adjusted-rate-mortgage (ARM) loans with

62. See MERS Today, MERSCORP HOLDINGS (2012),
http://www.mersinc.org/component/docman/doc_download/2-mhi-mers-today?Itemid= (last
visited Aug. 1, 2013) (diagramming the MERS process).
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teaser rates, cash-out home equity loans, and various subprime products.63
One type of RMBS pool that emerged was a second-lien RMBS. A
second-lien RMBS trust typically held second-lien mortgage loans. In the
case of default foreclosure, second-lien holders receive payment on their
loans only after the first-lien is satisfied.64 These new products appeared to
accelerate the demand for RMBS. As that demand increased in the early
2000s, loan originators and RMBS sponsors began cutting corners at every
level of the securitization process in order to meet investor demand.65
Those actions flooded RMBS trusts with mortgage notes that would not
allow the trusts to properly account for interest income inflow-outflow
mismatch. This jeopardized the REMIC classification of an untold, but
significant, percentage of all RMBS trusts.
Litigation decisions and documents detail the lax practices.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, downstream litigation (litigation between
borrowers and banks) is a primary source of information on lax
securitization practices. Upstream litigation (litigation between RMBS
investors and banks) is a primary source of information on unsavory
lending and loan-origination practices. The discussion of claims in this
Article assumes that the plaintiffs can support their claims in many of the
cases now being litigated. Given that these claims are consistent with the
findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the analysis in this
Article relies on the particulars in some of the cases to paint a picture of
what a typical REMIC might look like.66 Perhaps some RMBS trusts were
not as bad as the Article describes, but bad actions appear to have been
rampant and the portrait painted below likely describes many RMBS trusts.
The discussion also relies upon a select few filed complaints, but they are
consistent with dozens of other cases.67 Other studies and reports provide a
similar picture of the state of affairs in the RMBS and mortgage lending
industry leading up to the financial crisis.68

63. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 102 (describing the “factory
line” aspects of the securitization process).
64. What Is a Second Mortgage Loan or Junior Lien?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
(June 12, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/105/what-is-a-second-mortgageloan-or-junior-lien.html (last visited August 1, 2013).
65. See infra Part I.C.
66. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3 (providing examples of
the consequences of negligent securitization procedures and reckless lending practices).
67. See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5201, at 2 n.
1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012), available at
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/104/doc/opinion-order-fhfa-v-ubs-americas-sdny4-may-12.pdf (citing fifteen cases brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency against
numerous defendants with similar allegations); REFINBLOG, http://refinblog.com (analyzing
hundreds of downstream and upstream cases).
68. See, e.g., John M. Griffin, and Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in
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Deterioration of the Securitization Process (Downstream Litigation)

Corner-cutting in the lending and securitization process led to the
financial crisis. In re Kemp, a frequently cited decision from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, displays the failed securitization practices that preceded
the financial crisis.69 On May 31, 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
(Countrywide) lent $167,000 to John Kemp,70 and Mr. Kemp signed a note
naming Countrywide as the lender. No endorsement by Countrywide
appeared on the note.71 An unsigned allonge bearing the same date
accompanied the note and directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to the Order of
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., d/b/a America’s Wholesale Lender.”72 On
the same day, Mr. Kemp signed a mortgage in the amount of $167,000,
which listed the lender as America’s Wholesale Lender, named MERS as
the mortgagee, and authorized it to act solely as nominee for the lender and
the lender’s successors and assigns.73 The mortgage referenced the note
Mr. Kemp signed and was recorded in the local county clerk’s office on
July 13, 2006 (a month and a half after Mr. Kemp signed it).74
On June 28, 2006, Countrywide, as seller, entered into a PSA with
CWABS, Inc., as depositor (i.e., sponsor); Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP as master servicer; and Bank of New York (BNY) as
trustee.75 The PSA provided that Countrywide sold, transferred, or
assigned to the depositor “all the right, title and interest of [Countrywide]
in and to the Initial Mortgage Loans, including all interest and principal
received and receivable by [Countrywide].”76 The PSA also provided that
CWABS would then transfer the Initial Mortgage Loans, which included
Mr. Kemp’s loan, to the trustee in exchange for certificates referred to as
Asset-backed Certificates, Series 2006-8 (the RMBS).77 Presumably, the
depositor then sold the RMBS to investors.
Securitized Loans? (Working Paper, April 30, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract+2256060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256060 (describing role
of misrepresentation by MBS underwriters and loan originators in the events leading to the
financial crisis).
69. In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (holding that the bank was not the
holder and thus not entitled to enforce the debtor’s promissory note).
70. Id. at 627.
71. Id.
72. Id. An allonge is “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument
for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with
indorsements.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed. 2004).
73. Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627.
74. Id.
75. Id. Park Monaco, Inc., and Park Sienna, LLC, also entered into the PSA as sellers.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The PSA also provided that Countrywide, as depositor, would
deliver “the original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual or facsimile
signature in blank in the following form: ‘Pay to the order of ________
without recourse’, with all intervening endorsements from the originator to
the Person endorsing the Mortgage Note.”78 Although Mr. Kemp’s note
was supposedly subject to the PSA, Countrywide never endorsed it in blank
or delivered it to the depositor or trustee as required by the PSA.79 On the
date of the purported transfer, no one recorded a transfer of the note or the
mortgage with the county clerk.80 The PSA purported to assign Mr.
Kemp’s mortgage “[t]ogether with the Bond, Note or other obligation
described in the Mortgage, and the money due and to become due thereon,
with interest.”81 That assignment was recorded on March 24, 2008 (almost
two years after the purported assignment of the mortgage).82
On March 14, 2007, MERS assigned Mr. Kemp’s mortgage to
BNY as trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-backed
Certificates, Series 2006-8.83 On May 9, 2008, Mr. Kemp filed voluntarily
for bankruptcy.84 On June 11, 2008, Countrywide, as servicer for BNY,
filed a secured proof of claim noting Mr. Kemp’s property as collateral for
the claim.85 In response, Mr. Kemp filed an adversary complaint on
October 16, 2008 against Countrywide, seeking to expunge its proof of
claim.86 On September 9, 2009, Countrywide claimed to have possession
of the mortgage note.87
At trial in late 2009, Countrywide produced a new undated Allonge
to Promissory Note, which directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to the Order of Bank
of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate-holders CWABS, Inc., Assetbacked Certificates, Series 6006-8.”88 A supervisor and operational team
leader for the apparent successor entity of Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP (the master servicer in the PSA) testified that the new allonge
was prepared in anticipation of the litigation and was signed weeks before
the trial.89 That same person testified that Mr. Kemp’s original note never

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
2006-8.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. The allonge misidentified the asset-backed certificates as 6006-8 instead of
See id. at n.5.
Id. at 628. The record leaves some doubt about whether the supervisor worked for
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left the possession of Countrywide, but instead went to its foreclosure
unit.90 She also testified that the new allonge had not been attached to Mr.
Kemp’s note and that customarily, Countrywide maintained possession of
the notes and related loan documents.91
In a later submission, Countrywide represented that it had the
original note with the new allonge attached, but it provided no additional
information regarding the chain of title of the note.92 It also produced a
Lost Note Certificate dated February 1, 2007, providing that Mr. Kemp’s
original note had been “misplaced, lost or destroyed, and after a thorough
and diligent search, no one [had] been able to locate the original Note.”93
The court therefore concluded that at the time of the filing of the proof of
claim, Mr. Kemp’s mortgage had been assigned to BNY, but Countrywide
had not transferred possession of the associated note to BNY.94 Figure 5
summarizes the relevant Kemp facts, illustrating the failure to timely
transfer and record purported assignments of mortgage notes and
mortgages.

the successor of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP or Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
See id. at 626 n.3, 628 n.6 (providing a short description of the aftermath of Bank of
America taking over Countrywide’s entities).
90. Id. at 628.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 628–29.
93. Id. at 628 n.7.
94. Id. at 629 (explaining court’s decision to not recognize bank’s enforcement of note
because bank did not possess note).
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The same types of problems arise in upstream litigation because
the failure to transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the trusts negatively
affects the value of RMBS, violates representations in RMBS offering
materials, and disregards provisions of PSAs.95 Studies presented in
upstream litigation materials illustrate how rampant cases like Kemp had
become. A study of almost a thousand mortgages that were supposed to be
held by three RMBS trusts formed in 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively,
found that none of the mortgages had been assigned to the trusts on the date
the RMBS sponsor issued the RMBS.96 Within three months after the
issuances of the RMBS, less than 1% of the mortgages had been assigned
to the trusts, and more than half of the mortgages were never assigned to
the trusts.97 The study also found that the parties routinely failed to transfer
the mortgage notes to the RMBS trusts. A sample of 442 mortgage notes
found that only seven, or 1.6% of the total notes, were transferred to the
trusts within three months after the issuance of the RMBS.98 Investigations
also revealed that of the mortgages that the parties did eventually assign to
the RMBS trusts, several were assigned to the wrong trust.99 Other RMBS
trustees apparently disregarded and failed to disclose audit information that
confirmed that the RMBS trust did not have possession of the notes.100
Despite representations in the offering materials and provisions in
the PSAs to the contrary, many RMBS trusts did not hold mortgage notes
and mortgages they purported to hold on the issuance date. Even though the
trusts eventually acquired a small percentage of the mortgage notes and
mortgages, those acquisitions occurred several months after the formation
of the RMBS trusts. The RMBS sponsors were responsible for transferring
the mortgage notes and mortgages,101 but they knew that the RMBS trusts
did not have the mortgage notes or mortgages at the time the RMBS trust
was formed. The robo-signing scandal that occurred in the wake of the
financial crisis was rooted in part in an effort to remedy the problems that

95. See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint at 13–14, 19–20, HSH Nordbank AG v. Barclays
Bank PLC, No. 652678/2011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 2, 2012) (discussing risks to
investors from failure to assign mortgage notes to trusts); Knights of Columbus Amended
Complaint, supra note 46, at 11-17(describing the provisions of the PSAs).
96. See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 95, at 15–16 (discussing
investigation into mortgages that were represented to have been deposited in trusts).
97. See id. at 16.
98. See id. at 18.
99. See id. at 17 (analyzing the assignments of sampled mortgages).
100. See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at 21–22
(describing allegedly misleading practices by RMBS trustees concerning securities filings).
101. See, e.g., Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 95, at 19 (discussing
alleged failure of mortgage issuers to assign mortgages and notes into trusts).
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arise when notes are not properly transferred.102 This scandal is further
evidence that the securitization process in the years preceding the financial
crisis failed. Figure 6 depicts the securitization process described in Kemp,
which was prevalent in the years leading up to the financial crisis.

The discussion below illustrates how failure of the securitization
process jeopardizes the REMIC status of numerous RMBS trusts.103
D.

Deterioration of Lending Underwriting Practices (Upstream
Litigation)

The discussion of the securitization process reveals that RMBS
sponsors did not transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the RMBS
trusts. Even if the sponsors had transferred the mortgage notes and
mortgages, the quality of the loans represented by the notes and mortgages
was so poor that they would not satisfy REMIC requirements. The
following discussion illustrates that RMBS sponsors failed to adequately
102. The “robo-signing scandal” refers to the widespread practice by lenders of forging
signatures and engaging in other inappropriate behavior in foreclosure cases. Alan Zibel et
al., U.S., Banks Near ‘Robo-Signing’ Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577169014293051278.html.
103. See infra Part II.A (describing the ownership requirement for REMIC).
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perform due diligence or act on information from the due diligence they did
perform, and lenders abandoned responsible mortgage underwriting
practices. As a result of the failed due diligence and underwriting
functions, loans made to unqualified borrowers for homes with undesirable
occupancy rates entered into RMBS trusts. Poor appraisal practices also
left loans under-collateralized. As a result of these problems, many loans
were delinquent (or soon to be delinquent) when they entered the RMBS
trusts.
1.

Failure of Mortgage Underwriting and Due Diligence

A critical part of RMBS securitization is mortgage underwriting.
Loan originators underwrite loans they make to borrowers. Underwriting
in this context is the process of assessing the potential risk and profitability
of making a loan to a particular borrower.104 Traditional home mortgage
underwriting included three elements: (1) collateral, (2) borrower
creditworthiness (i.e., willingness to pay), and (3) the borrower’s capacity
to pay (e.g., income).105
Originators abandoned those traditional
underwriting guidelines and, often with the knowledge of RMBS sponsors,
transferred low-quality mortgage notes and mortgages to RMBS trusts.
Originators found that the riskier loan products were the most profitable, so
they pressed sales agents to push those products, which included option
ARM, home equity, and subprime loans; originators even structured salesagent compensation to encourage such efforts.106
As a result of the failed underwriting function, lending practices in
the mid-2000s became abysmal. Originators failed to verify borrowers’
employment or income, made loans to borrowers whom they knew could
not repay the loans or even make required payments, and reduced the time
that had to pass since a borrower’s prior bankruptcy.107 Originators also

104. See WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND
INVESTMENTS 213 (13th ed. 2008); DAVID C. LING & WAYNE R. ARCHER, REAL ESTATE
PRINCIPLES: A VALUE APPROACH 304 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining basic traditional home
mortgage underwriting, with a focus on various risk factors).
105. See LING & ARCHER, supra note 104, at 304 (elaborating on the impact of
collateral, creditworthiness, and capacity to pay as it applies to mortgage underwriting
decisions).
106. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. JPMorgan Chase &
Co., No. 11 Civ. 6188, at 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012) (on file with authors); Vikas
Bajaj, Subprime Mortgage Lending: A Cross-Country Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, (May 8,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/business/worldbusiness/08ihtsubprime.4.5623442.html (discussing the lending practices of mortgage companies).
107. See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 93, 172–187; Bajaj, supra
note 106.
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forged proof of loan applicants’ employment and rent-paying history.108
One originator developed a process called the High Speed Swim Lane
(HSSL or Hustle) model for loan origination, complete with the motto,
“Loans Forward, Never Backward.”109 As part of Hustle, the origination
eliminated toll gates that slowed the originator process, including processes
necessary for originating investment-quality loans and for preventing
fraud.110 Hustle even eliminated the underwriting function from all but the
riskiest loans.111 Originators also steered borrowers to high-risk products
and granted loans without establishing credit scores.112 Using this process,
originators made loans to nearly all applicants, even though many clearly
did not qualify.113 RMBS sponsors were aware that originators had
abandoned their underwriting guidelines.114
RMBS sponsors also let their due diligence practices slip well
below the standards they represented in offering materials. For example,
sponsors instructed due diligence vendors not to verify occupancy status or
credit scores.115 Sponsors knew that they had to accept bad loans to
preserve business relationships with loan originators, so they disregarded

108. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Examples of Mortgage and Real Estate Fraud
Investigations - Fiscal Year 2013, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Mortgage-and-RealEstate-Fraud-Investigations-Fiscal-Year-2013 (listing successful prosecutions involving
misrepresentations in loan applications of employment, rent payment and other material
terms); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12 (noting Minnesota Attorney
General’s office found “file after file where the [Ameriquest] borrowers were described as
‘antiques dealers’”).
109. See Complaint-in-Intervention at 16, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No.
12 Civ. 1422 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/October12/BankofAmericanSuit/BofA%20C
omplaint.pdf (describing techniques allegedly used to eliminate quality control processes).
110. See id. (discussing the way in which Hustle allegedly eliminated mechanisms in
place for preventing fraud).
111. See id. (alleging that Hustle encouraged risky loans).
112. See, e.g., Dexia v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 231, 239-40
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing loans that originator issued despite obvious problems with
borrowers’ qualifications); Press Release, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial
Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag1694.html (describing Countrywide’s alleged discriminatory lending practices).
113. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at xxii (describing
Countrywide lending practices); BoA Complaint-in-Intervention, supra note 109, at 16
(describing Countrywide lending practices).
114. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at xxii (describing lending
practices of major financial institutions during the events preceding the financial crisis);
JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 197–232.
115. See Dexia 929 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (alleging that sponsors of mortgage backed
securities engaged in fraudulent practices).
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due diligence standards and accepted poor-quality loans.116 They also
abandoned basic due diligence tasks, such as determining the
reasonableness of income in a stated-income loan.117 Sponsors would
uncover problematic loans, but they would still accept them into RMBS
trusts. One study shows that up to 65% of the loans accepted into
securitizations violated underwriting guidelines, but RMBS sponsors
knowingly included them.118 The poor quality of these loans did not satisfy
REMIC requirements.119
2.

Failed Appraisal Function

Pressure to produce loans also caused the appraisal function to fail.
The failure of the appraisal function resulted in misstated loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios of securitized loans. The LTV ratio is one of the most
important measures of the riskiness of a loan. Loans with high LTV ratios
are more likely to default because the property owners have less interest in
a property with a high LTV ratio.120 For example, if a loan is 90% of a
$150,000 property, the property owner’s interest in the property is only
$15,000 ($150,000 x 10%), giving the property owner 10% equity. But if
the LTV ratio is 60%, the property owner’s interest is $60,000 ($150,000 x
40%). Thus, the property owner with an LTV ratio of 60% would lose
more than a property owner with an LTV ratio of 90% if the owner of the
mortgage foreclosed. An RMBS trust is also much less likely to recover
the amount of a loan in a foreclosure sale if a borrower with a high LTV
ratio defaults on a loan.121
An important aspect of the LTV ratio is the appraised value of the
property securing the loan. To help ensure that the appraised value was
high enough to meet the representations in the RMBS offering materials
before the financial crisis, sponsors pressured originators and originators
116. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 109-11; J. P. Morgan
Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 18 (arguing that due diligence providers approved bad
loans in order to maintain relationships with originators); Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v.
Credit Suisse Group AG, No. 653665/2011, at 35–47 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County Dec. 29,
2011).
117. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 109-11 (discussing
mortgage underwriting standards during financial crisis); J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint,
supra note 7, at 19 (describing the due diligence practices of Clayton Holdings with regards
to residential mortgage backed securities).
118. J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 19.
119. See infra Part II.B (describing requirements necessary to attain REMIC
classification).
120. See generally Min Qi & Xiaolong Yang, Loss Given Default of High Loan-toValue Residential Mortgages, 33 J. BANKING & FIN.788, 799 (2009).
121. See id. (discussing the characteristics of high loan-to-value residential mortgages).
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pressured appraisers to ensure that appraised values met the sponsors’
requirements.122 In fact, a 2007 study reported that 90% of appraisers had
been pressured to raise property valuations.123 Originators blacklisted
appraisers who refused to inflate collateral values, and sponsors instructed
due diligence vendors not to review appraisals.124 As a result of these
measures, appraisers increased stated appraisal values of collateral 80% of
the time when originators requested reconsideration.125
The failed appraisal function caused the LTV ratio of numerous
loans to be much higher than sponsors represented. Widespread and
systematic overvaluations by mortgage originators created a snowball
effect that inflated appraised housing prices across the country.126 To
illustrate, an appraiser might overvalue a home by 10% based upon
comparable sales and a few months later overvalue a similar home by an
additional 10% based on the recent appraisal.127 Through this cumulative
process, appraisals significantly contributed to a run-up in property
values.128 For example, the LTV ratio of a $100,000 loan would be about
90% of the property’s value, were the value $111,000. If the appraiser
overstated the value by 10%, so the property’s value appeared to be
$122,000, the LTV ratio for the $100,000 loan would appear to be about
82%, instead of 90%. An additional 10% overstatement on a similar home

122. See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 77. See also Peter S. Goodman &
Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N. Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 2008, at A1 (describing the practice of originators and appraisers in the early 2000s);
Michael Moss & Geraldine Fabrikant, Once Trusted Mortgage Pioneers, Now Scrutinized,
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1 (discussing the lending practices of prominent financial
institutions).
123. See Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 77–78; see also Press Release, A.G.
Schneiderman Secures $7.8 Million Settlement With First American Corporation And
Eappraiseit For Role In Housing Market Meltdown (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-78-million-settlement-firstamerican-corporation-and.
124. See, e.g., Dexia, 929 F. Supp. 2d 231; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3,
at 18, 91-92 (discussing practices by appraisers during the events preceding the financial
crisis); Vikas Bajaj, In Deal with Cuomo, Mortgage Giants Accept Appraisal Standards, N.
Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/business/04loans.html
(describing the pressure faced by appraisers to value homes that match or exceed loan
amounts).
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 78 (citing the testimony of
Richard Bitner, a former executive of a subprime mortgage originator); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM’N, supra note 3, at 18, 91-92 (reviewing trends in housing prices as a result of
mortgage originator practices).
127. See Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 78 (citing the testimony of Richard
Bitner, a former executive of a subprime mortgage originator).
128. See, e.g., id.; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 18, 91-92.
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would give it an appraised value of $134,000. A $100,000 loan on such
property would have a 75% LTV ratio. The cumulative process of poor
appraisal practices thus had a significant effect on LTV ratios.
Other practices, such as the use of piggy-back loans (i.e., second or
third loans issued on the acquisition of a property to help ensure that the
LTV ratio of the first mortgage does not exceed 80% of the value of the
collateral) also affected the LTV ratios. A loan with an LTV ratio of less
than 80% has a low LTV ratio and is a desirable loan, but a loan is
underwater if it has an LTV ratio greater than 100% (i.e., the loan exceeds
the value of the property).129 RMBS sponsors routinely overstated the
percentage of loans that they securitized with low LTV ratios and
understated the percentage of loans that were underwater.130 In fact, studies
of loans in numerous RMBS trusts found that the RMBS sponsors routinely
represented that the pools had no underwater loans.131 Samples of the loans
in those pools showed percentages of underwater loans in several pools
exceeding 10% and some exceeding 30%.132 Not surprisingly, RMBS
sponsors appeared to be aware of the inflated appraisals and the effect they
had on LTV ratios.133 Nonetheless, they populated RMBS trusts with
under-secured loans.134 Those actions undermined REMIC classification.135
3.

Failure to Screen and Cure Delinquent Loans

RMBS sponsors knew that the delinquency and default rates of
securitized loans were much higher than they represented or that the loans
would become delinquent shortly after securitization.136 For example,
129. See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 81; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,
supra note 3, at 404.
130. See Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 81–82 (presenting data that shows one
RMBS promoter overstated the percentage of loans with low LTV ratios by as much as 42%
and understated loans that were underwater by as much as 40%); JPMorgan Amended
Complaint, supra note 106, at 138–142 (presenting data that shows RMBS promoters
routinely overstated the loans with low LTV ratios and understated the percentage of
underwater loans).
131. See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 138–142; Stichting
Complaint, supra note 116, at 28-29.
132. See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 138–142; Nordbank
Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28-29.
133. See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 79–82.
134. See, e.g., Dexia v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240 (S.D.N.Y.
2013)
135. See infra Part III.B (describing the requirements for an RMBS to qualify to be a
REMIC).
136. See, e.g., Dexia, 929 F. Supp. 2d at 239-240 (describing loans that an originator
issued despite obvious problems with the borrowers’ qualifications); J. P. Morgan Securities
Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–26 (describing defendant’s alleged failure to remove loans
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RMBS sponsors transferred loans to trusts prior to the expiration of the
early payment-default period (the thirty to ninety-day period following the
purchase of a loan during which the sponsor could force the originator to
repurchase a delinquent or default loan).137 Transferring loans to trusts
before the expiration of the early payment-default period greatly increases
the likelihood that the loans will go into default while in the RMBS trust.138
Sponsors also knew that loans from certain originators had high
delinquency rates, but they continued to purchase loans from those
originators and securitize them.139 In fact, sponsors recognized that a
significant portion of the loans that they securitized were thirty or more
days delinquent, but they continued to transfer them to trusts and sell
securities in the trusts.140
Despite high delinquency rates,141 RMBS sponsors did not enforce
the repurchase provisions of the PSAs.142 Instead, sponsors and originators
colluded to skirt repurchase provisions for their own gain at the expense of
the RMBS investors. RMBS sponsors supposedly adopted quality control
measures to determine whether the loans maintained their quality after
being transferred to the trust.143 If a loan was in default prior to the end of
the early payment-default period, it would be defective, and would be
covered by the PSA’s repurchase provision.144 Instead of enforcing the
repurchase provision and removing defective loans from the RMBS trust,
however, sponsors entered into confidential settlements with originators at
a fraction of the loan’s original price.145 Sponsors then pocketed the
settlement payments and left the defective loan in the RMBS trust.146 This
behavior not only deprived RMBS investors of assets that were rightfully
theirs; it also demonstrated that RMBS sponsors were well aware that the
loans they securitized were below the quality level represented in their

from securitization that it had identified as defective).
137. See Amended Complaint at 23, Dexia SA/NV v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., No.
650180/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012).
138. See id. at 23–24 (describing Bear Stearns’ undisclosed policy to securitize loans
before expiration of the early payment-default period).
139. See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 11 (claiming that the
sponsor knew that almost 60% of an originator’s loans were thirty or more days delinquent,
but continued to purchase loans from that originator).
140. See id. (referring to securitization as a “SACK OF SHIT” and “shit breather”
because the loans the sponsor was securitizing were believed to be of terrible quality).
141. See, e.g., Dexia, 929 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (describing originator’s actual knowledge
of high delinquency rates on borrowers’ loans).
142. See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28.
143. See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.04.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28.
146. See id.
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offering materials. These practices could have denied RMBS trusts
REMIC classification.147
E.

Realistic Hypothetical RMBS Trust

As the financial crisis approached, the state of the RMBS industry
grew bleaker, and an increasing number of RMBS products failed to meet
clear legal standards. Until courts decide cases with respect to specific
RMBS trusts and facts are published, the general public cannot know the
specific bad acts in which RMBS organizers engaged. Nonetheless,
information in the news media, academic studies, court filings and
government reports provides the basis for constructing a realistic
hypothetical RMBS trust. Many, perhaps the vast majority, of RMBS
trusts created in the years leading up to the financial crisis appear to have
had significant defects.148 The realistic hypothetical trust provides an
opportunity to apply the REMIC requirements to an RMBS trust created
prior to the financial crisis. The analysis reveals the almost certain
impossibility that such a trust could be a REMIC. It also provides a
blueprint that the IRS (or private parties in qui tam or whistleblower cases)
can follow to challenge REMIC classification. A similar analysis would
apply to other RMBS trusts that may not be as defective as this
hypothetical RMBS trust.

Characteristics of Realistic Hypothetical Second-Lien RMBS Trust
• The sponsor issued RMBS in the hypothetical trust in
early 2007.
• The sponsor did not transfer any of the mortgage notes or
assign any of the mortgages to the RMBS trust within
three months after the date it issued the RMBS securities
to investors.
• The mortgages in the RMBS were recorded in MERS’s
name as nominee for the originators, but there is no
public record of the assignment of the mortgages to the
RMBS trust.

147. See infra Part III.B. (describing the qualified mortgage requirement for REMIC
classification).
148. Undoubtedly, some trusts would not suffer from all of the ills that afflict our
hypothetical trust. Nonetheless, no serious observer would dispute the almost certain
possibility that trusts like the realistic hypothetical trust were formed and continue to exist.
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• An affiliate of the originator serviced the mortgage
notes.
• The RMBS trust consists only of second-lien loans.
• The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns have
the following composition:
o The originator did not obtain verification of the
borrowers’ employment for 75% of the loans;
o The LTV ratio for of 75% of the loans exceeded
100% on the date of formation;
o Within the early payment-default period, 66% of
the loans were in default, but the sponsor made
no effort to remove the loans from the RMBS
trust; and
o The occupancy rate of the collateral was
significantly lower than the occupancy rate
represented in the offering materials.
• The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns were
geographically diverse, with loans from all or many of
the fifty states.
• The RMBS sponsor would not require the originator to
repurchase defective loans and would retain settlement
proceeds received from the originator for defective loans.
II.

REMIC QUALIFICATION

With a somewhat clear picture of the RMBS industry in the years
leading up to the financial crisis, and with a realistic hypothetical trust to
examine closely, the analysis turns to the tax aspects of REMICs. Federal
tax treatment of REMICs is important in two respects. First, it specially
classifies REMICs as something other than tax corporations, tax
partnerships, or trusts and generally exempts REMICs from federal income
taxation.149 Second, it treats regular interests in REMICs as debt
instruments.150 These two characteristics provide REMICs and their
investors with favorable tax treatment. REMICs must compute taxable
income, but because the regular interests are treated as debt instruments,
REMICs deduct from their gross income amounts that constitute interest
payments to the holders of regular interests.151 Without these rules, a

149. I.R.C. § 860A(a)(2006).
150. I.R.C. § 860B(a) (2006); I.R.C. § 860C(b)(1)(A) (2006).
151. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006) (allowing “as a deduction all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on indebtedness”); I.R.C. § 860C(b)(1)(A) (2006) (treating regular
interests in REMICs as debt instruments); Van Brunt, supra note 32, at 168:
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REMIC would most likely be a tax corporation and the regular interests
could be equity interests.152 If that were the case, the REMIC would not be
able to deduct payments made to the regular interest holders and, as a
taxable C corporation, would owe federal income tax on a significant
amount of taxable income.153 Thus, REMIC classification provides
significant tax benefits.
To obtain REMIC classification, an RMBS trust must satisfy
several requirements.154 Of particular interest in this context is the
requirement that within three months after the trust’s startup date,
substantially all of the RMBS trust assets must be qualified mortgages or
permitted investments (the substantially-all test).155 Mortgage notes would
not come with the definition of permitted investment, so this article focuses
on whether an RMBS trust’s assets would be qualified mortgages.156 Thus,
REMIC classification has four requirements: (1) the ownership requirement
(the RMBS trust must be the tax owner of qualified mortgages); (2) the
qualified-mortgage requirement (the assets of the RMBS trust must be
qualified mortgages); (3) a timing requirement (the RMBS trust must own a
static pool of qualified mortgages within three months after the RMBS
startup date); and (4) the substantially-all requirement (the RMBS trust’s
assets must be almost exclusively qualified mortgages).
Congress and the Treasury designed the REMIC classification
rules for arrangements that existed in 1986, when Congress created
REMICs.157 The rules do not address the wide-scale problems of the
financial crisis, so many of the issues discussed in the following analysis

[R]egular interests in the REMIC shall be treated as indebtedness of the
REMIC. This is one of the important advances made by the REMIC
legislation—to remove the vexing debt vs. equity issue. In this context, the
principal effect of this statutory pronouncement is to ensure that relevant
payments to regular interest holders constitute interest and thus are deductible in
computing REMIC taxable income or net loss.
152. If an arrangement loses REMIC status, it will likely be classified as a taxable
mortgage pool or a publicly-traded partnership (assuming its interests are publicly traded).
See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.04.
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 860D(a) (2006) (defining REMIC); I.R.C. § 860D(b) (2006)
(requiring the RMBS trust to make an election).
155. I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2006).
156. The principal assets of a mortgage-backed security are mortgages, not the type of
asset that comes within the definition of a permitted investment. Thus, the test is whether
the assets are qualified mortgages. If mortgage notes fail to come within the definition of
qualified mortgages, they will most likely not come within the definition of a permitted
investment.
157. See supra Part I.A. (discussing 1986 Tax Reform Act and REMIC flow-through
treatment).
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will be issues of first impression if a court considers them.158 A large body
of law addresses the question of tax ownership in various contexts,
including the ownership of obligations,159 but none of that law contemplates
whether a purported REMIC is the tax owner of mortgage notes. Beyond
the guidance in the regulations, no authority appears to address the
qualified-mortgage requirement, the timing requirement, or the
substantially-all requirement. Thus, existing law provides a framework for
part of the analysis, but much of the analysis is original. The law of tax
ownership makes the analysis of the ownership requirement larger (but no
more important) than the analysis of the other requirements.
A.

Ownership Requirement

An arrangement comes within the definition of REMIC only if it
owns qualified mortgages within the required time period (assuming none
of its assets are permitted investments).160 The federal tax definition of
ownership governs whether a purported REMIC owns qualified
mortgages.161 Federal tax law does not defer to the state-law definition of
ownership, but it does look to state law to determine parties’ rights,
obligations, and interests in property.162 Tax law can also disregard the
transfer (or lack of transfer) of formal title where the transferor retains
many of the benefits and burdens of ownership.163 Courts focus on whether
the benefits and burdens of ownership pass from one party to another when

158. Courts are just beginning to define the relationship between the REMIC rules,
foreclosure statutes, and the laws governing the transfer of notes. See, e.g., Glaski v. Bank
of America, No. F064556 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2013) (holding that voiding an attempted
transfer of note or mortgage was justified when it protected beneficiaries of the trust from
potential adverse tax consequences of losing status as REMIC trust).
159. See infra Part II. A. (discussing ownership requirement for REMIC classification).
160. See I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2006) (requiring substantially all of a purported REMIC’s
assets to be qualified mortgages or permitted investments within three months of startup
date).
161. See Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Beneficial Ownership and The REMIC
Classification Rules, 28 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 274 (Nov. 14, 2012) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175766.
(discussing importance of tax classification for REMICs and questionable tax classification
of purported REMIC trusts).
162. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (“The state law creates legal
interests, but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed. We examine
[state] law only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the leases conform to the standard
which the taxing statute prescribes for giving the favored treatment to capital gains.”).
163. See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 44, 47 (2nd Cir. 1990) (discussing cases where the
courts have disregarded the transfer of formal title when the transferor continues to retain
many of the benefits and burdens of ownership).

BORDEN AND REISS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/3/14 10:03 AM

REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT

695

considering who is the tax owner of the property.164 “To properly discern
the true character of [a transaction], it is necessary to ascertain the intention
of the parties as evidenced by the written agreements, read in light of the
attending facts and circumstances . . .”165 If, however, the transaction does
not coincide with the parties’ bona fide intentions, courts ignore the stated
intentions.166 Thus, the analysis of ownership cannot merely look to the
agreements the parties entered into, because the label that parties give to a
transaction does not determine its status.167 Instead, the analysis must
examine the underlying economics and the attending facts and
circumstances to determine who owns the mortgage notes for tax
purposes.168

164. Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237 (1981); Sollberger v.
Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2012); Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315,
1327 (11th Cir. 2012); Kinsey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2011-257 (2011). See also I.R.S.
Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009, at 13 (Apr. 20, 2001) (stating that “transfer of a
substantial portion of the benefits and burdens of ownership of property is not characteristic
of a financing,” but rather constitutes sale of an entity’s ownership interest); I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (stating that “a transaction is a sale if the benefits
and burdens of ownership have passed to the purported purchaser”). In Grodt the Tax Court
listed eight factors that it considered relevant in determining whether a sale occurs for tax
purposes:
(1) Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction; (3)
whether an equity was acquired in the property; (4) whether the contract creates
a present obligation on the seller to execute and deliver a deed and a present
obligation on the purchaser to make payments; (5) whether the right of
possession is vested in the purchaser; (6) which party pays the property taxes;
(7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and (8) which
party receives the profits from the operation and sale of the property.
Grodt, 77 T.C. at 1237–38 (internal citations omitted).
165. Haggard v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 1124, 1129 (1955), aff’d 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956)
(holding that petitioners whose payment was excessive in relation to the fair rental value of
a property, intended to and did acquire an equity in the property).
166. See Union Planters Nat’l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117
(6th Cir. 1970) (“We do not agree that subjective intent is decisive here.”); Farley Realty
Corp. v. Comm’r, 279 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that “the parties’ bona fide
intentions may be ignored if the relationship the parties have created does not coincide with
their intentions”).
167. See Helvering v. F.& R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (standing for the
proposition that “formal written documents are not rigidly binding”); Mapco Inc. v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (recognizing that a transaction “was not an
economically real sale and, therefore, cannot be recognized as a sale for tax purposes”);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-191-20 (Dec. 20, 1979) (disregarding a lease agreement to rule
privately that an arrangement was a sale).
168. See Lazarus, 308 U.S. at 255 (“In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws,
and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are
not rigidly binding.”); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (standing for the
proposition that courts will not “exalt artifice above reality”); Washington Mut. Inc. v.
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The analysis of mortgage-note ownership begins with an
examination of a fundamental indicium of owning an obligation—the right
to enforce the obligation.169
In re Kemp addressed the issue of
enforceability of a mortgage note under the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) in the bankruptcy context.170 The court held that a note was
unenforceable against the maker of the note and the maker’s property under
the U.C.C. on two grounds.171 First, the court held that the alleged owner
of the note, BNY, could not enforce the note because it did not have
possession and because the note lacked proper endorsement.172
Recognizing that the mortgage note came within the U.C.C. definition of
negotiable instrument,173 the court considered who was entitled to enforce a
negotiable instrument under the U.C.C.174 The three types of persons
entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument are:
[1] the holder of the instrument, [2] a nonholder in possession of
the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or [3] a person not
United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) (“As an overarching principle, absent
specific provision, the tax consequences of any particular transaction must reflect the
economic reality.”); Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975) (“‘Technical
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which
inventive genius may construct’ must not frustrate an examination of the facts in the light of
economic realities.” (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)); Union
Planters, 426 F.2d at 118 (“In cases where the legal characterization of economic facts is
decisive, the principle is well established that the tax consequences should be determined by
the economic substance of the transaction, not the labels put on it for property law (or tax
avoidance) purposes.” (citing Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1958),
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).
169. See JAMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED TOPICS 80 (4th ed. 2011) (“The power to
control encompasses the right to take any of the actions relating to a debt instrument that
may be taken by its owner, including enforcing or modifying its terms or disposing of the
asset.”).
170. See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 629 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (stating that a claim in
bankruptcy is disallowed after an objection “to the extent that . . . such claim is
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or
applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured.”)
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1)). New Jersey adopted the U.C.C. in 1962. CLARK E. ALPERT
ET AL., GUIDE TO NEW JERSEY CONTRACT LAW § 1.3.2 (2011). This article cites to the
U.C.C. generally, instead of specifically to the New Jersey U.C.C., to illustrate the general
applicability of the holding. Other courts have reached conclusions similar to the
Bankruptcy Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Cutler v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 109 So. 3d 224,
226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that if a bank could not establish that it was the
holder of the mortgage note or allonge that “took effect prior to the date of the complaint, it
did not have standing to bring [a foreclosure claim]”).
171. Kemp, 440 B.R. at 629–30.
172. Id. at 629–30.
173. See id. at 630 (citing the definition of “negotiable instrument” in [U.C.C. § 3-104]).
174. Id.
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in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the
instrument pursuant to [U.C.C.] Section § 3-309 or 3-418(d).175
The court then explained why BNY was not a person entitled to enforce the
mortgage note. First, the court described why BNY was not the holder of
Mr. Kemp’s note. A holder is “the person in possession of a negotiable
instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is
the person in possession.”176 A person does not qualify as a holder by
merely possessing or owning a note.177 Instead, a person becomes a holder
through “negotiation.”178 The two elements of negotiation are: (1) transfer
of possession to the transferee and (2) endorsement by the holder.179 The
court recognized that because BNY never came into physical possession of
the note, it was not the holder.180 It also recognized that the endorsed
allonge was not affixed to the original note until the second trial date (the
first trial date is relevant for determining rights), so BNY also failed to
satisfy the second element.181 Thus, to have the rights of enforcement as
holder, a person must be in possession of an endorsed note at the time when
holder status is important. Based on this analysis, many RMBS trusts,
including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would not be
considered holders of many of the mortgage notes they claim to own.
Second, the court described why BNY was not a non-holder in
possession.182 The U.C.C. provides that “[a] person may be a person
entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner
of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument,”183 which
would include a person in possession who is not a holder.184 Therefore, a
person can be a non-holder in possession if the person acquires an
unendorsed note as a successor to a holder of the note.185 The court
175. U.C.C. § 3-301 (2006).
176. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21) (2005).
177. See Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev. Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1988)
(explaining what is insufficient to qualify as a note holder, noting that ownership alone is
not by itself automatically sufficient).
178. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (2002).
179. See U.C.C. § 3-201(b) (2002).
180. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630 (citing Dolin v. Darnall, 115 N.J.L. 508, 181 A. 201
(E&A 1935)) (“Since the plaintiff was not ‘in possession of’ the notes in question, he was
neither the ‘holder’ nor the ‘bearer’ thereof.”). The court also rejected the claim that the
Bank of New York was in constructive possession of the note because the U.C.C. requires
actual possession. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 631 n.13 (citing N.J.S.A. § 12A:1-201(20)).
181. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630-31.
182. See id. at 632 (analyzing the characteristics of a non-holder in possession).
183. See id. at 632 (quoting N.J.S.A. § 12A:3-301).
184. U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment (2002).
185. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632 (outlining the third category in which a claimant can
enforce a note, whereby a party can qualify as a non-holder in possession If said party buys
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recognized that BNY was a successor to a holder and would qualify as a
non-holder in possession, if it had possession of the note.186 Because BNY
lacked possession, however, it was not a non-holder in possession.187 Many
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would
similarly fail to be non-holders in possession of many of the mortgage
notes they claim to own.
Finally, the court concluded that BNY did not qualify as a nonholder not in possession that could enforce the note.188 A non-holder not in
possession of a note can enforce a note that is lost, destroyed, or stolen.189
To enforce the note under these rules, however, the person must satisfy
three requirements.190 First, prior to the loss, the person must have been in
possession of the note and have been entitled to enforce it when the loss of
possession occurred.191 Second, the loss of possession cannot have been
the result of transfer by the person or a lawful seizure.192 Third, the person
must be unable to reasonably obtain possession because the instrument was
destroyed, the person cannot determine its whereabouts, or it is in the
wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person that cannot be
found or is not amenable to service of process.193 Finding that BNY was
never in possession of the note, the court held that it was not a non-holder
not in possession. Considering common practices of the times, many
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would
also fail to qualify as non-holders not in possession.194

the note and becomes the successor to the holder of the note, but where in the facts of the
actual case, the successor did not have possession); U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment (2002).
186. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632 (explaining how BNY could qualify as a non-holder in
possession if it was a successor to the holder).
187. See id. at 632 (explaining why BNY could not enforce the note as a non-holder in
possession, because although it was the successor as holder of the note, it never actually had
possession of the relevant notes).
188. See id. at 633 (showing how the UCC permits enforcement of lost, destroyed, or
stolen instruments).
189. See U.C.C. § 3-309 (2002).
190. See U.C.C. § 3-309(a) (2002) (outlining the requirements for enforcing an
instrument by a person not in possession of the instrument).
191. See U.C.C. § 3-309(a)(1)(A) (2002) (detailing how the right to enforce the
instrument when loss of possession occurred can result in instrument enforcement).
192. See U.C.C. § 3-309(2) (2002).
193. See U.C.C. § 3-309(3) (2002).
194. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632–33. Kemp cites Marks v. Braunstein, 439 B.R. 248
(D.Mass. 2010), which held that a person who was never in possession of the note could not
enforce it. The purpose of requiring prior possession in a lost-note claim is to protector a
borrower from multiple claims, but the Marks court followed a strict interpretation of the
statute and disallowed the claim of the person who was never in possession of the note, even
though conflicting enforcement claims were not a concern in the case. See 439 B.R. at 251
(citing Premier Capital, LLC v. Gavin, 319 B.R. 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004)).
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Another important aspect of the court’s decision in In re Kemp is
the discussion regarding the difference between ownership of a note and
the right to enforce the note. The court recognized that the recorded
assignment of the mortgage evidenced an attempt to assign the note, and
the PSA provided for an assignment of the note.195
The court
acknowledged that those documents “created an ownership issue, but did
not transfer the right to enforce the note.”196 “The right to enforce an
instrument and ownership of the instrument are two different concepts.”197
The U.C.C. acknowledges that a person may transfer all right, title, and
interest in a note to a transferee, which gives the transferee a claim to
ownership of the note.198 The transferee is not, however, entitled to enforce
the note until the transferee obtains possession of it, so transfer of the
instrument occurs only when the transferor delivers it to the transferee.199
Thus, the court concluded that BNY had a valid claim to ownership, but did
not have the right to enforce the note.200 Based upon sworn testimony,
originators retained possession of mortgage notes as a matter of course.201
Because many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS
trust, did not have possession of the mortgage notes on the startup date, or
three months thereafter, they could not enforce the notes during that time
period. Thus, they lacked an important indicium of ownership at the
relevant time.
Courts and the IRS have considered note ownership for tax
purposes in other contexts, and a number of cases and rulings provide
additional guidance for considering who owns the notes and mortgages.
The IRS derived eight factors from the cases that courts consider to
195. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 633.
196. Id. Indeed, under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which the Kemp court did not consider
because it focused on enforceability, BNY might have been the owner of the note. See
generally Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersection: The Right to Foreclose and the UCC, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316152 (discussing the intersection of
Articles 3 and 9 of the U.C.C.).
197. U.C.C. § 3-203 Comment 1 (2002).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632–34. (noting that someone may be entitled to enforce an
instrument even if they are not the owner, and that BNY, although the owner of the note, did
not have rights to enforce said note, while also finding that that even if Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., as servicer for the Bank of New York and holder of the note, was the agent of
the Bank of New York, it would have no greater right than the Bank of New York had.
Because the Bank of New York had no right to enforce the note, Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., would have no right to enforce the note). This ruling refutes the position that even
though the REMIC trust does not have possession of a note, it can enforce it through the
PSA using the servicer as an agent.
201. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628-29 (discussing possession of the instrument at issue).
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determine whether the benefits and burdens of an obligation pass from one
party to another.202 The respective factors do not have any particular
weight, and circumstances will determine which factors are the most
important.203 In fact, “an exclusive list of factors risks over-formalizing the
concept of ‘sale,’ hamstrings a court’s effort to discern a transaction’s
substance and realities in evaluating tax consequences.”204 Thus, courts
may apply a flexible, case-by-case analysis to determine whether benefits
and burdens have transferred.205 The economics of a transaction may,
however, dictate that only the risk of loss and potential for gain have real
significance, and then only to the extent that they are economically
realistic.206 Thus, the factors aid with the analysis, but they are not
definitive. The following discussion illustrates, however, that many of the
benefits and burdens of owning mortgage notes did not transfer to many
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust.
The first factor for considering who owns a note is whether the
parties treat the transactions as a sale.207 Courts and the IRS consider many
different variables when deciding whether parties treat a transaction as a
sale. For example, they look at the agreement between the parties.208 In the
case of purported REMICs that were part of MERS-facilitated
securitizations, PSAs provided that the originator would transfer mortgage
notes and the purported REMIC trusts would acquire them.209 PSAs also

202. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (determining
whether the transaction constituted a sale or a pledge of the pool of subordinated mortgage
loans, while listing eight factors to consider in making such a determination); I.R.S. Tech.
Adv Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (providing the eight factors involved in an analysis on
whether or not a sale occurred).
203. See Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (balancing factors to
determine transaction was a sale, not a loan); Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1124–
25 (9th Cir. 2012); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (noting
factors’ importance are fact-specific and that no one factor is dispositive).
204. See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561, 573 (1978) and Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975)).
205. See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Gray v. Comm’r, 561 F.2d 753, 757 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
206. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (focusing on risk of loss in
a typical high quality auto loan securitization).
207. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (outlining factors
assessed to determine whether obligation passes from one party to another and whether the
transaction can be treated as a sale).
208. See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1220–22, 1230 (1970)
(examining how the petitioner treated a transaction, and how the obligations to repay the
bank rested in the petitioner, such that it could be categorized as a loan by the bank to the
petitioner and its guarantors as opposed to any other party).
209. See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 627; Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint,
supra note 46, at 11–17 (laying out the PSA provisions for purported REMICs in MERS-
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provided that mortgage servicers and REMIC trustees would verify the
transfer of the mortgage notes and grant the REMICs legal recourse to
obtain untransferred notes.210
Agreements, however, may be inconclusive because they may have
conflicting positions.211 Courts and the IRS will also ignore the agreement
if its title conflicts with the parties’ intent.212 Instead, they will consider
whether the purported transferee parted “with any substantial incident of
ownership . . . of the obligation,”213 and whether the purported transferee
“retained title to, and possession of, the . . . obligations.”214
Leading up to the financial crisis, originators commonly retained
possession of mortgage notes, so in that respect, they did not treat their
RMBS trust transactions as transfers.215
Sponsors disregarded the
repurchase provisions of PSAs and, instead of purging RMBS trusts of
defective loans, agreed to receive settlement proceeds from the
originators.216 Thus, while PSAs provided for the transfer of possession of
mortgage notes, sponsors routinely disregarded those provisions. Sponsors
did this in the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust as well. The actions of
both sponsors and originators before the financial crisis therefore conflicted
with relevant agreements.
Courts and the IRS will also look at how parties treat a transaction
for tax and accounting purposes to determine tax ownership.217 For federal
income tax and accounting purposes, sponsors and originators appear to

facilitated securitizations).
210. See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at 21–22
(evidencing such a framework, providing various provisions of a PSA and what rights and
obligations exist between the parties).
211. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (finding language
in a servicing agreement that treated the transaction as a sale and language in the private
placement memorandum that treated the transaction as a financing arrangement).
212. See Haggard v. Comm’r, 241 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The intent of the
parties was perfectly plain. The bare fact that one of the joined documents was drawn in
lease form and terminology by the parties is of no consequence.”).
213. Town & Country Food Co. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 1049, 1057 (1969).
214. Id.
215. See supra Part II.A.
216. See supra Part I.D.3.
217. See Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that
parties stopped reporting interest earned on purported collateral and purported borrower
stopped making interest payments); United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215,
1220–22, 12221-22 (1970) (discussing arrangement between bank and petitioner and
respective assignment of responsibilities, as well as petitioner’s method of deducting tax
liability over years in dispute); Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 446
(N.D. Ga. 1970) (recognizing that taxpayer continued to pay intangibles tax due from owner
of a note held that no transfer occurred); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr.
20, 2001).
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have treated RMBS trusts as both owners and non-owners. With no
information to the contrary, this analysis assumes that those parties
allocated cash flows from borrowers to the trusts, which the trusts in turn
paid to RMBS investors. RMBS trusts also presumably recognized interest
income from loans and deducted interest paid to RMBS investors.
Presumably, they also allocated phantom income to the holders of residual
interests. In these ways, originators and sponsors treated RMBS trusts as
tax owners of mortgage notes.
Nonetheless, the originators and sponsors knew that a significant
percentage of the loans in RMBS trusts were defective, but they did not
replace them.218 Instead, they agreed between themselves to settle the
originators’ repurchase prices and deprive the RMBS investors of their
right to the funds.219 Thus, originators and sponsors knew that the loans in
RMBS trusts were worth less than the amount accounted for, but they did
not adjust their tax accounting accordingly. In this respect, they treated
someone other than the RMBS trust as tax owner of the mortgage notes.
Taxes also include recording fees that parties must pay to record
the transfer of a mortgage note or mortgage. Sponsors and originators
treated the transaction as something other than a sale for state fee recording
purposes. Many mortgages recorded by MERS provide that MERS is
nominee or agent of the mortgagee’s successors or assigns, but sponsors
and originators often would not record the assignment of a mortgage note
to the RMBS trust. Apparently, they did this in order to avoid paying
recording fees and taxes at the time of the purported transfers from the
originator to the trust.220 Consequently, for state recording fee purposes,
they treated the originator or MERS as the owner of the mortgage note, but
not the trust. Local jurisdictions are now seeking recording fees for
unrecorded assignments of mortgage notes.221 Failure to record the transfer
of mortgage notes to RMBS trusts is another way in which originators and
sponsors treated someone other than the RMBS trusts as tax owner.

218. See supra Part I.D.3.
219. Id.
220. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628 (recording assignment of mortgage twenty-one months
after the parties executed the PSA and the originator purportedly transferred the note and the
trust acquired it); Christian Cnty. Clerk v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 515 Fed.
Appx 451, 453) (dismissing case brought by county clerks in Kentucky seeking recording
fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (denying MERSCORP’s motion to dismiss counties’ claim for recording
fees).
221. See, e.g., Christian County Clerk, 515 Fed. Appx. at 453 (dismissing case brought
by county clerks in Kentucky seeking recording fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery
County, 904 F. Supp. 2d 436 (denying MERS’s motion to dismiss counties’ claim for
recording fees).
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The second factor for considering who owns a note is whether the
parties notify the obligor of the transfer of obligations.222 Failure to notify
the obligor of a transfer of an obligation generally indicates that the
transaction was not a transfer.223 Case law does not expound on this factor,
but its application appears to be straightforward. In the case of securitized
mortgage notes, the obligors are the borrowers. The originators could
notify the obligor of a transfer by direct communication or public notice.
The originator could provide public notice by recording the transfer in
county records. Indeed, the purpose of recording transfers of mortgages is
to put the public (including the obligor) on notice of the transfer in order to
prevent multiple claims for the same note.224 In fact, legal conflicts often
arise because obligors are unsure of who holds a mortgage note and who
has the right to bring foreclosure actions on the corresponding property.
By failing to record the assignment of mortgages or providing other
notification, originators and sponsors failed to notify borrowers of a
transfer of the obligation. This factor suggests the RMBS trusts, including
the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the
mortgage notes.
The third factor for ownership considers which party serviced the
obligations.225 Generally, the originator, or an entity affiliated with the
originator, services an RMBS trust’s mortgage notes.226 The originator’s
continuing to service an obligation generally indicates that the originator is
the tax owner of the note.227
The fourth ownership factor is whether payments made to the
purported transferee correspond to collections on the debt instrument.228 If
222. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998).
223. See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1230 (1970) (“As far as
the customer knew, the [originator] was the person to whom he was indebted.”).
224. See WOLF, supra note 48, § 37.27.
225. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Mem.
98-39-001 (May 29, 1998).
226. See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627 (providing that the PSA named Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., as originator and Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (an affiliate of
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) as servicer).
227. See United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1229–30 (“The [originator] continued to
handle all collections and otherwise to service its customers. In fact, there was no contact
between the customer and the bank.”); Town & Country Food Co., 51 T.C. at 1057 (“[The
originator] collected payments as they became due and deposited them in its own bank
account.”).
228. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (stating that a
transaction is classified as a sale if benefits and burdens of ownership are passed to alleged
purchaser); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (stating that one of the
factors examined in determining whether benefits and burdens of ownership have been
transferred include whether payments to transferees correspond to collections on notes).
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payments to transferees correspond to collections on obligations, the
transaction is more likely to be treated as a transfer.229 But courts have
stated that corresponding payments are not dispositive.230 PSAs generally
required the originator (so long as it retained the servicing rights) to collect
payments from obligors and deliver them to the RMBS trust or the RMBS
investors net of appropriate fees,231 so if record-keeping was accurate and
borrowers made scheduled payments on the notes, payments to the
transferee would generally correspond to collections. Such payments
would therefore indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners.
PSAs also provide that originators are obligated to repurchase or
replace defective loans.232
Sponsors, however, would not enforce
repurchase obligations and would retain settlement payments paid by
originators to compensate for defective mortgage notes.233 Repurchase
payments are one type of payment on the loans, and RMBS trusts would
not receive those payments. Because payments to RMBS trusts did not
correspond with the collections by the sponsor of repurchase settlement
proceeds, such actions would suggest that some RMBS trusts, including the
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the
mortgage notes.
The fifth ownership factor contemplates whether the transferee
imposes restrictions on the operations of the transfer that are consistent
with a lender-borrower relationship.234 Cases holding that transactions
were loans secured by notes and not transfers of the notes often considered
restrictions that lenders placed on the borrowers to help secure repayment

229. See Branham v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 175, 180 (1968) (agreeing with IRS’s contention
that series of installment payments resulting from note that were identical to amount of
principal and interest due to petitioner, which was subsequently transferred to the
petitioner’s daughters in exchange for stock in another company, amounted to transfer of
ownership benefits).
230. See United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1228 (“[T]here is no basis in law upon which
to conclude that merely because the amount borrowed is substantially equal to the face
amount of the collateral, the taxpayer has thereby disposed of the collateral.”).
231. See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 4.02.
232. See id. at § 16.04.
233. See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28 (alleging that J. P.
Morgan’s quality control department failed to eliminate defective loans that entered
securitization, where in some situations it led to J. P. Morgan seeking and obtaining
confidential settlements for toxic loans without repurchasing the defective loans as actually
required).
234. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (declaring that one
factor in deciding if a sale occurred includes whether restrictions indicative of a lenderborrower relationship are imposed by the transferee); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 (May
29, 1998) (stating that one factor involved in determining whether a sale occurred is whether
the transferee creates limitations on the operations of the transferor that express a lenderborrower type relationship).
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of the loan and protect the collateral.235 Such restrictions include keeping
records in a manner that satisfies a lender, allowing the lender to audit the
borrower’s books, furnishing periodic financial statements to the lender,
paying taxes as they become due, keeping the collateral insured, requiring
approval for other purchases, and restricting both the payment of
compensation and dividends and the creation of other indebtedness.236
Distinctive restrictions also include margin account payment requirements
and requirements to maintain a certain ratio of collateral to debt.237 A
borrower’s need to satisfy such requirements and its ability to borrow
additional funds using the same debt as collateral further show that the
arrangement is a loan, not a transfer.238 A judge applying this factor would
consider whether the RMBS trust or sponsor (as potential lender) imposed
restrictions like the ones listed above on the originator. PSAs do not
appear to explicitly restrict the originator’s operations. Thus, this factor
appears to indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners of the mortgage
notes.
The sixth factor considers who has the power to dispose of an
obligation.239 The lack of restrictions on the sale of a note suggests power
of disposition.240 Arrangements that clearly allow one party to dispose of

235. See, e.g., United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1230 (1970) (concluding that a
petitioner’s relationship with a bank was that of a borrower and debtor on the basis of
various restrictions placed upon the petitioner by the bank, including recording keeping
requirements, rights of audit, and tax liability); Union Planters Nat’l Bank of Memphis v.
United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117, 118 (6th Cir. 1970) (concluding that for tax liability
purposes, the economic substance of the transaction, including what restrictions banks place
to prevent loss of principal, are what determines whether a particular set of transactions
qualify as sales or secured loans); Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 446
(1970) (evaluating restrictions imposed by the lenders upon a taxpayer who utilized a
customer’s installment payments as security for demand loans from the bank to determine
whether tax liability results from this form of securitization).
236. United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1230 (1970).
237. See Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117-118 (noting that the bank involved in the case
went to significant lengths to ensure that it did not bear the risk of loss); Yancey Bros., 319
F. Supp. at 446 (noting that the taxpayer loan agreements at issue in the case required a
105% collateral to debt ratio to be maintained as part of the note’s conditions, while using it
to evaluate whether the events in the case amount to a taxable transaction or event).
238. See Yancey Bros., 319 F. Supp. at 446 (discussing taxpayer’s ability to borrow
additional funds, including the ability to consolidate existing debt into a single borrowing
note without the addition of more collateral).
239. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (concluding that
one of the factors to determine if a transfer is a sale includes an evaluation of which party
had the power of disposition); Tech. Adv Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (stating that one
factor to consider in deciding if a transaction is a sale includes determining whether or not
the party had power of disposition).
240. See Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34 (ruling that taxpayer was free to dispose of
obligations at any time despite puts on the obligations).
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notes even if they are in the possession of another party also suggest power
of disposition.241 The rights to dispose of notes, to transfer the registration
of the notes, and to keep interest due on the notes point to the person who
has the power to dispose of notes.242 In cases that rely upon this factor, the
originators of notes could dispose of the notes if they replaced the collateral
or had sufficient other collateral to secure the lender’s right to
repayment.243 For example, a manufacturer could sell notes if the value of
the remaining notes it held were sufficient to satisfy the lender who held a
security interest in the notes.244 In other cases, courts consider whether one
party has complete dominion of an asset in determining power of
disposition.245 The pre-financial crisis RMBS arrangements do not
squarely align with any of these cases. Neither the RMBS trusts, the
originators, nor the sponsors appear to have had complete dominion over
the mortgage notes.
Without possession of the mortgage notes, a person cannot transfer
possession of the notes. An RMBS trust that did not have possession of
notes could sell the rights it had under PSAs to receive payments, but it
could not transfer all of the interests and rights in negotiable mortgage
notes prior to taking possession of them.246 Therefore, an RMBS trust that

241. See, e.g., Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117 (holding that the owner was the party
that listed the bonds for sale, in spite of a formal distinction and concession by the
government that the Bank held formal title to the bonds as a matter of property law); Am.
Nat’l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 1970) (recognizing that dealers
held complete dominion over bonds as they came into possession of the lending bank, and
dealers could sell the bonds at any time to the dealers’ customers).
242. See Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315, 1327-30 (11th Cir. 2012) (evaluating the
rights of respective purported owners of securities to determine whether or not the
transaction constituted a sale for tax liability purposes, including evaluating factors such as
entitlement to receive benefits from the transaction that resulted, the right to sell or transfer
the notes without the permission of the original owner and transferor, among others);
Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that petitioner
Sollberger’s claims that a transaction he engaged in was not a sale for tax purposes were not
valid because the transaction amounted to sale of his floating rate notes to another party,
thereby imposing capital gains tax liability and implicitly suggesting he had powers of
disposition of the floating rate notes at issue).
243. See Town and Country Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 1049 (holding that use
of installments paid by customers to secure loans from a third party was not a sale or
disposition which obligated reporting of gains under section 453(d) of the tax code).
244. See Town and Country, 51 T.C. at 1049.
245. See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the party that
had the exclusive right in a film to control distribution, determine the title, date of initial
release, advertise, make copies, possess, and distribute to various media was the owner of
the film).
246. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT ON
APPLICATION OF THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTG.
NOTES AT 5-6 (November 14, 2011), available at
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lacked possession could not transfer the negotiable note to someone who
would become a holder in due course.247 A rational buyer would not pay
fair market value for a negotiable note that did not bestow upon it rights of
a holder in due course. Furthermore, the REMIC rules generally prohibit
RMBS trusts from transferring any mortgage notes.248 PSAs also generally
prohibit RMBS trusts from transferring any mortgage note they hold to
ensure that they comply with the REMIC rules.249 Thus, as a practical
matter, RMBS trusts probably cannot dispose of mortgage notes,
undermining the position that they are tax owners of the notes.
The originator and RMBS trust would confer very different rights
upon potential purchasers of the notes. A person who purchased the note
from the originator could become a holder of the note and be entitled to
enforce it.250 In fact, the originator could sell an untransferred mortgage
note to other purchasers who could become a holder of the mortgage note
in due course.251 A holder in due course who purchased a mortgage note
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111411.
pdf (noting that pursuant to U.C.C. section 3-301, one must possess or have formerly
possessed a note to be a person entitled to enforce it). The situation with non-negotiable
notes is very different. See Dale A. Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The
Curious Problem of the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement To Enforce the
Note, 66 ARK. L. REV. 21, 27 (2013) (“It is clear that, unlike a negotiable instrument,
enforcement rights in a nonnegotiable note can be transferred by a separate document of
assignment.”).
247. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (2005) (defining a “holder” as one in possession).
248. See I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2) (noting that a prohibited transaction includes disposition of
qualified mortgages transferred to the REMIC with a limited set of exceptions).
249. See, e.g., Pooling And Servicing Agreement for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-3 and Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3, by and among Long Beach Securities
Corp., Depositor, Long Beach Mortgage Company, Seller And Master Servicer and
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee (dated as of April 1, 2006), at 190
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355515/000127727706000388/psalongbeach_200
63.pdf (discussing various prohibited transactions and activities barring depositors, master
servicers, and trustees from disposing of mortgage notes with limited exceptions, with
intentions of avoiding prohibited transactions).
250. See U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002) (listing the persons entitled to enforce such a note).
251. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2002):
“[H]older in due course” means the holder of an instrument if: (1) the
instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent
evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete
as to call into question its authenticity; and (2) the holder took the instrument (i)
for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the instrument is overdue or
has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to payment
of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that
the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v)
without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306, and
(vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment
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from an originator following a purported transfer to an RMBS trust would
have greater rights in a mortgage note than the RMBS trust.252 The RMBS
trust’s recourse in such a situation would be against the originator for
breach of contract and possibly theft.253 Thus, the originator who retains
possession of a mortgage note has the power to dispose of the note, but the
RMBS trust only has power to transfer some of the rights under the note.254
A good faith transferee of the mortgage note from the originator would
have more rights than a good faith transferee of the RMBS trust’s rights in
the note. In fact, as RMBS litigation proceeds and additional facts emerge,
finding that originators sold single notes to multiple buyers would not be
surprising.255 Neither originators nor RMBS trusts have carte blanche to
dispose of the notes, so this factor does not appear to weigh conclusively in
either direction. The factor is probably more damning for the RMBS trusts,
however, because they are seeking tax ownership.
The seventh factor examines which party bears the risk of loss.256
This may be the most important factor in determining the tax owner of a
mortgage note.257 In a private ruling, the IRS devoted considerable text to
analyzing who bears the risk of loss in a loan securitization arrangement.258
described in Section 3-305(a).
252. See U.C.C. § 3-306 (2002):
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in
due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the
instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to
recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights of a holder in due
course takes free of the claim to the instrument.
253. See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.04.
254. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-52-002 (Sep. 16, 1985) (ruling privately that the
facts and circumstances determined that the party in possession of assets was not the tax
owner). The IRS also considers contractual repurchase agreements and tacit understanding
of parties in determining who is the tax owner of an asset. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8552-002 (Sep. 16, 1985).
255. See JOHN ARNHOLZ & EDWARD E. GAINOR, OFFERINGS OF ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES 14-34 (2013):
Outright fraud is probably unlikely when the parties are well known to each
other and a transaction is as highly publicized as a typical MBS offering. But
the risk of an inadvertent transfer of mortgage loans should not be lightly
dismissed. The authors recall too many occasions on which a client called to
report the discovery that assets purportedly transferred had been pledged or sold
to another party.
256. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001; see I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998).
257. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (“[T]here is no real
opportunity for gain due to lower than expected prepayments. Thus, who bears the risk of
loss must determine whether the transaction is a sale or secured financing.”).
258. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
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The IRS identified both credit risk and prepayment risk as types of risk that
accompany mortgage securitization.259 Credit risk is the risk that borrowers
will not make payments as provided in the loan agreements.260 Prepayment
risk is the risk that borrowers will refinance when interest rates go down
and pay off existing mortgage notes before their maturity dates and that the
holder of a note will hold a note with a below-market yield if the interest
rates go up.261 Another risk of securitization is modification risk.262
Modification risk is the risk that the borrower will modify the loan to
reduce the amount of monthly payments.263
A mortgage securitization arrangement can transfer any
combination of such risks from the originator or provide that the originator
will retain any combination of the risks. For example, if an originator
retains the most junior tranches of certificates issued with respect to an
RMBS trust or it agrees to repurchase defective mortgages, it retains most
of the credit risk.264 Many RMBS trusts had been structured this way,265 so
originators often retained the credit risk by retaining junior RMBS
tranches. The parties to a securitization arrangement can transfer the
prepayment risk and modification risk to the holders of more senior
tranches if they require RMBS trusts to use available funds to pay the
holders of senior tranches first.266 In fact, the economic incentives that
accompany different types of risk affect investors’ behavior and
preferences.267 Investors who hold senior RMBS tranches bear most of the

Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998).
259. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (noting that
mortgage loans present dual risks of credit risk and prepayment risk).
260. See id. (discussing credit risk and prepayment risk in the context of mortgage
loans).
261. See id.
262. See Nuveen Investments, Prospectus for Nuveen Mortgage Opportunity Term Fund
2 at 78 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at
https://www2.morganstanley.com/wealth/Markets/IPOCenter/Prospectus/?DocID=p_JMTC
E.
263. See id.
264. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001).
265. See Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, Incentives and Tranche Retention in
Securitisation: A Screening Model 4 n.4 (BIS Working Papers No 289, May, 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/cbrworkshop09/fendermitchell.pdf (“[I]n early
securitizations, originators would routinely hold on to the equity piece of their
transactions. . . . . [E]quity tranches, even when originally retained, were increasingly sold
or hedged”).
266. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (ruling privately
that a sufficient amount of the economic benefits and burdens transferred to warrant treating
the arrangement as a transfer for tax purposes).
267. See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS, 60-62 (2012):
What the FDIC staff understood early on—frankly, before anyone else—was
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prepayment risk; investors in junior tranches or the originator bear most of
the credit risk.268 Margin accounts, repurchase agreements, and other
mechanisms can also influence who bears the risk of loss. Thus,
determining who bears the risk of loss is fact-specific.
The IRS privately ruled in a non-REMIC mortgage securitization
that the trust bore the prepayment risk and the originator bore the credit
risk.269 Similarly, in REMIC mortgage securitization, originators and
REMICs each bear risk. Originators of the loans conveyed to many RMBS
trusts agree to repurchase the mortgage notes that do not satisfy
underwriting requirements.270 Indeed, originators created reserves to cover
the estimated costs they would incur as a result of the risks they retained.271
Even though RMBS sponsors retained repurchase settlement payments,272
suggesting that the RMBS trust bore the risk of loss, courts will most likely
hold the RMBS sponsors liable for paying those proceeds to the RMBS
trusts. Courts will also likely enforce the PSAs and hold originators liable
for repurchasing or replacing the defective mortgage notes. Thus, in the
case of an RMBS trust knowingly formed with defective mortgage notes,
the RMBS trust would not bear the risk of loss of the mortgage notes.
Many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien mortgage
RMBS trust, would not bear the risk of loss of mortgage notes.
The eighth factor considers which party had the potential for
gain.273 The IRS observed that the potential for gain is the obverse of
bearing risk.274 Consequently, one might conclude that if the originator or
sponsor bore the risk of loss, the RMBS trust might have the potential for
gain. The application of this factor to RMBS trusts is unclear, especially if
the parties wanted to qualify for REMIC classification. A REMIC does not
have the opportunity to profit from the disposition of mortgage notes. If

that the usual forces of economic self-interest would not result in the kind of
wide-scale restructuring that was needed to avoid a massive wave of
foreclosures. That was because through the securitization process, those who
owned the mortgages were different from those who would be responsible for
restructuring them and the legal contracts governing the modification process
created economic incentives skewed in favor of foreclosure.
268. See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.02.
269. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001).
270. See ARNHOLZ & GAINOR, supra note 255, at § 1.04.
271. See DOLAN & DAVIS, supra note 52, at § 7.01.
272. See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 27-28 (discussing how
funds from confidential settlements for toxic debt were retained by the bank instead of being
credited to the affected RMBS trusts).
273. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998); see I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
Mem. 2001-30-2009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (analyzing the potential for gain on the mortgage
loans).
274. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001).
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the notes appreciate in value and a REMIC sells the notes, any gain it
recognizes will be taxed at 100%.275 Because the tax would consume any
gain, the REMICs have no potential for gain from the mortgage notes. The
IRS has also concluded that if there is no real opportunity for gain, “who
bears the risk of loss must determine whether the transaction is a sale or
secured financing.”276 RMBS trusts appear to provide no real opportunity
for lawfully acquired gain from the mortgage notes, so the focus is on the
risk of loss instead of the potential for gain. Nonetheless, REMIC-intended
RMBS trusts’ inability to profit from the disposition of mortgage notes
suggests they are not the tax owners of the mortgage notes.
Table 1 summarizes the tax-ownership analysis of the hypothetical
second-lien mortgage RMBS trust using the eight factors for ownership
discussed above. The summary suggests that the IRS could make a strong
case that many RMBS trusts, especially the hypothetical second-lien
RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the mortgage notes.
Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical RMBS Trust
Factor

RMBS Trust
Owned the Note

(1) Did parties
treat the
transaction as a
sale?

PSA provided
that originator
transferred notes;
federal tax
accounting of
interest and
principal.

(2) Were obligors
notified of
transfer of
obligation?
(3) Which party
serviced the
obligation?

Loan documents
may provide for
possibility of
assignment.

RMBS Trust Did
Not Own the
Note
Originators
retained
possession of
notes; transfer
not recorded;
recording fees
not paid; sponsor
retained
settlement
payment.
No public record
of assignment;
perhaps no direct
notification.
Affiliate of
originator
serviced the
obligation.

275. I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2)(A).
276. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 2012).

Direction
Balance Leans
RMBS trust
not tax owner.

RMBS trust
not tax owner.
RMBS trust
not tax owner.
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Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical RMBS Trust
Factor

RMBS Trust
Owned the Note

(4) Did payments
to the transferee
correspond to
collections on the
debt instrument?

Principal and
interest payments
to RMBS trust
corresponded to
collections.

(5) Did the
transferee impose
restrictions on the
operations of the
transferor?
(6) Which party
had power of
disposition?

No distinctive
restrictions
imposed.
Originator could
transfer
possession of the
notes.

(7) Which party
bears the risk of
loss?

(8) Which party
has the potential
for gain?

Originator could
not dispose of
mortgage notes
for gain.

RMBS Trust Did
Not Own the
Note
Settlement
payments for
defective loans
did not
correspond to
sponsor’s
collection of
those payments.

Direction
Balance Leans
Not apparent.

RMBS trust
tax owner.

PSA restricted
RMBS trust’s
right to transfer
notes; tax law
penalizes
transfers; RMBS
trust did not have
possession of
notes.
PSA obligated
RMBS trust to
cure defective
loans, and many
loans were
defective.
100% tax on
gains from
dispositions
prohibits RMBS
trust from
realizing gain.

Not apparent.

RMBS trust
not tax owner.

RMBS trust
not tax owner.

In addition to applying the multiple-factor test for tax ownership to
mortgage notes, the courts and IRS may also estop purported RMBS trusts
from arguing that they are owners of notes that they do not possess. Courts
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and the IRS apply a substance-over-form doctrine to disregard the form
taxpayers choose if the form does not reflect the economic substance of the
transaction.277 They generally do not, however, allow taxpayers to rely
upon a substance argument to take a position that differs from the
taxpayer’s chosen form.278 If RMBS trusts and originators chose not to
transfer the mortgage notes to the trusts, the principle of estoppel weakens
the trusts’ arguments that they were tax owners of notes of which they
chose not to take possession.
Commentators anticipate that RMBS trusts may argue that the
REMIC rules merely require the REMIC to be the beneficial owner of the
obligations.279 That argument fails because beneficial ownership is
analogous to tax ownership, and courts apply the Grodt & McKay benefits
and burdens test to determine who is the beneficial owner of property.280 In

277. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (applying a substance-overform approach to assess corporate reorganization).
278. See, e.g., Branham v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 175, 175 (1968) (finding that the taxpayer’s
assignment of a note was “absolute on its face” and holding that the taxpayer had transferred
the note); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (“Taxpayer would be bound
by the form of its transactions if it were the first to assert that its transactions were
[something other than the chosen form]”).
279. See Borden & Reiss, supra note 161, at 278; Lee A. Sheppard, The Crazy Train of
Mortgage Securitization, TAX NOTES 639, 645 (Nov. 8, 2010). Beneficial ownership often
appears in the trust context, but even in that context, it closely relates to the concept of tax
ownership. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (8th ed. 2004) (defining beneficial
owner as “[o]ne recognized in equity as the owner of something because use and title belong
to that person, even though legal title may belong to someone else; esp., one for whom
property is held in trust.”). The tax statute provides that qualified mortgage includes “any
participation or certificate of beneficial ownership” in an obligation.
I.R.C. §
860G(a)(3)(A).
The REMIC regulations refer to beneficial ownership in two places. First, they
prohibit a disqualified organization from acquiring beneficial ownership of a residual
interest in a REMIC. Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(5)(i)(B). That reference does not, of
course, address the tax ownership of an obligation. Second, they provide that the definition
of “obligations secured by interests in real property” includes “other investment trust
interests that represent undivided beneficial ownership in a pool of obligations principally
secured by interests in real property and related assets that would be considered to be
permitted investments if the investment trust were a REMIC.” Treas. Reg. § 1.860G2(a)(5). That reference is clearly to an interest in a trust. If the originator holds the
mortgage notes, a purported REMIC would have to establish that the originator held the
mortgage notes in trust and that the trust was an investment trust to rely upon that rule. The
documents used to create the REMICs do not appear to make any provisions for the
originator to be trustee, and the originators probably would not come within the definition of
investment trust. Furthermore, such a claim would contradict representations in the REMIC
offering documents, which did not provide that the originator would hold the mortgage
notes in trust.
280. See, e.g., Estate of Kenneth L. Lay v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (2011)
(“The status of the legal title to the annuity contracts does not control in determining
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fact, defendants in upstream litigation acknowledge that tax ownership is
the appropriate test to apply in determining whether a purported REMIC is
the owner of the obligations.281 Beneficial ownership would be relevant to
an RMBS trust only if the originator held the mortgage note in trust for the
RMBS trust.282
If an RMBS trust fails to establish that it is the tax owner of
mortgage notes, tax law must re-characterize the arrangement. If a
purported REMIC received and distributed proceeds, it would own some
sort of asset capable of generating cash flow. That asset could be a loan
from the originator, the sponsor or another party to the securitization. The
security for such a loan could be mortgage notes that would come within
the definition of qualified mortgage. But such a loan does not itself come
within that definition.283 Because the asset would be something other than
a qualified mortgage, the arrangement would fail to be a REMIC.
This analysis suggests that a court would likely find that many
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not
the tax owners of mortgage notes. The facts of some RMBS trusts may

whether a sale occurred. Beneficial ownership, and not legal title, determines ownership for
Federal income tax purposes.”); Ragghianti v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 346 (1978), aff’d, without
published opinion, 652 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1981); Pac. Coast Music Jobbers, Inc. v. Comm’r,
55 T.C. 866, 874 (1971), aff’d, 457 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972).
The federal income tax consequences of property ownership generally depend upon
beneficial ownership rather than possession of mere legal title. Speca v. Comm’r, 630 F.2d
554, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1980), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1979-120; Beirne v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 268,
277 (1973). “[C]ommand over property or enjoyment of its economic benefits, which is the
mark of true ownership, is a question of fact to be determined from all of the attendant facts
and circumstances.” Monahan v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 235, 240 (1997) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Hang v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 74, 80 (1990)). “[A] sale occurs upon the
transfer of the benefits and burdens of ownership rather than upon the satisfaction of the
technical requirements for the passage of title under State law.” Houchins v. Comm’r, 79
T.C. 570, 590 (1982). The determination of whether the benefits and burdens of ownership
have been transferred is one of fact and is based on the intention of the parties, evidenced by
their written agreements and the surrounding facts and circumstances. Paccar, Inc. & Subs.
v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 754, 777 (1985), aff’d, 849 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1988); Grodt & McKay
Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. at 1237; Ragghianti, 71 T.C. at 349. Beneficial ownership
is marked by command over property or enjoyment of its economic benefits. Yelencsics v.
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1513, 1527 (1980) (holding that the entire interest in a stock was sold even
though the title to the stock was not transferred).
281. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., HSH Nordbank
v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 652678/2011, 24 n. 38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty., May 11, 2012),
available at
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=xKBnC5REEod
DnG7SCCByTg==&system=prod (addressing tax ownership as related to ownership of the
obligations).
282. See Borden & Reiss, supra note 161.
283. See infra Part II.B.
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nonetheless indicate that the RMBS trust is the tax owner of the mortgage
notes. In such cases the RMBS trusts may still fail to qualify as REMICs
because they fail to satisfy other REMIC requirements. As the following
analysis indicates, the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust will almost
certainly fail to satisfy other REMIC requirements. The analysis also
provides a template for analyzing REMIC classification for other RMBS
trusts.
B.

Qualified Mortgage Requirement

An RMBS trust must satisfy the qualified mortgage requirement to
be a REMIC.284 A qualified mortgage is an obligation that is principally
secured by an interest in real property.285 This definition has three
elements: (1) obligation, (2) principally secured, and (3) secured by an
interest in real property. An asset must satisfy all three elements to be a
qualified mortgage. Many of the assets in RMBS trusts do not satisfy these
elements.
1.

Obligation

A qualified mortgage must be an “obligation (including any
participation or certificate of beneficial ownership therein).”286 The
REMIC rules do not specifically define obligation. The common legal
definition of obligation is “[a] legal or moral duty to do or not do
something . . . . A formal, binding agreement or acknowledgment of a
liability to pay a certain amount or to do a certain thing for a particular
person or set of persons; esp., a duty arising by contract.”287 A mortgage
note would satisfy this definition of obligation because the maker of the
note agrees to pay a certain amount. An originator’s promise under a PSA
to transfer mortgage notes would also come within the definition of
obligation. Participation or certificates of beneficial ownership in an
obligation include “non-REMIC pass-through certificates (including senior
and subordinated pass-through certificates and IO [Interest Only] and PO
[Principal Only] strips) . . . .”288 A pass-through certificate is an interest in
a trust or other arrangement that holds a pool of mortgage notes or other
debt instruments.289 IO and PO strips are types of stripped bonds and

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra Part II.
I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A).
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004).
See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 169, at 456.
Id. at 23.
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coupons governed by section 1286 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
grant a holder the rights to identified payments on bonds.290 Thus, a strip
that grants an RMBS trust the right to receive certain payments due on an
obligation principally secured by an interest in real property would appear
to satisfy the definition of obligation. These rules are consistent with the
general definition of qualified mortgage, which includes any regular
interest in another REMIC.291
Because pre-financial crisis RMBS trusts received cash flow, they
must have been the tax owners of some type of property. Even if the
properties RMBS trusts owned were not qualified mortgages, they could
have been obligations. For instance, it could be an obligation from the
originator to transfer mortgage notes and to transfer payments on the notes.
Such an obligation would not be a pass-through certificate, however, unless
the arrangement with the originator was a trust. This does not appear to
have been the case, because PSAs do not create a trust on behalf of the
RMBS trust.292 Thus, the properties owned by RMBS trusts seem to be
either mortgage notes—for RMBS trusts that are the tax owners of the
notes—or rights to receive something from the originator. The properties
owned by an RMBS trust could therefore be binding obligations, even if
they are not mortgage notes per se. Obligations in a form other than
mortgage notes would not satisfy other elements of the definition of
qualified mortgage because they would not be principally secured by an
interest in real property.
2.

Principally Secured

An obligation is principally secured only if it (1) satisfies the 80%
test, (2) satisfies the alternative test, or (3) comes within the reasonablebelief safe harbor.293 As the following discussion illustrates, the lending
and underwriting practices during the years leading up to the financial
crisis will have prohibited many mortgage notes from being principally
secured under any of those three alternatives. Any other obligation that an
RMBS trust might hold will also fail to satisfy any one of the tests.

290. Id. at 438. A stripped bond is a bond that separates the ownership of the bond from
any coupons or interest that have not yet come due, and a stripped coupon is the coupon
related to the bond. Id. at 701.
291. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(C).
292. See Borden & Reiss, supra note 14, at 277-279.
293. Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1).
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The 80% Test

An obligation satisfies the 80% test only if the fair market value of
the interest in real property securing the obligation is at least 80% of the
adjusted issue price of the obligation on one of the following two dates: (1)
the obligation’s origination date,294 or (2) the date the trust acquires the
obligation by contribution.295 In other words, the 80% test compares the
value of the collateral to the amount of a loan, so it considers the value-toloan (VTL) ratio of a mortgage note. The VTL ratio is the inverse of the
LTV ratio that RMBS sponsors and investors use. The 80% test requires
the VTL ratio of a loan to be at least 80%. Two definitions are key to
computing the VTL ratio: the definition of adjusted issue price and the
definition of the fair market value of the collateral.
The REMIC rules do not define adjusted issue price of an
obligation. Instead, the rules rely on the definitions of “adjusted issue
price” in other areas of tax law, particularly in the original issue discount
(OID) rules.296 One such definition provides that the adjusted issue price of
a debt instrument is the instrument’s issue price at the beginning of its first
accrual period.297 The issue price for a home mortgage should be the
amount of the loan.298 After the first accrual period, the adjusted issue price
is the issue price increased by any original issue discount that any holder of
the instrument included in income and decreased by any payments other
than qualified stated interest made on the instrument.299 The adjustments
that occur between the origination of a loan, and a transfer of it to an
RMBS trust normally should not significantly affect the adjusted issue
price of the mortgage note because transfers generally occur shortly after
origination.300 This analysis assumes that the adjusted issue price is the
amount of the loan.
The definition of fair market value in the 80% test applies on a
property-by-property basis. The test assigns the value of property first to
senior liens. The amount assigned to senior liens reduces the fair market

294. Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)-(b).
295. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i)(B) (qualifying obligations that are at least
equal to 80 percent of the adjusted issue price of the obligation at the time the sponsor
contributes the obligation to the REMIC as meeting the 80-percent test).
296. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 167, at 455, 58.
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1).
298. See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2) (noting that the issue price of a debt instrument not issued
for property and not publically offered is the price paid by the first buyer of the instrument);
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(g)(5), Example 1 (deducting points from the borrower’s
payment to determine issue price).
299. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1)(i), (ii).
300. See supra Part I.
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value of the interest in real property assigned to other liens.301 Other liens
that are on par with the obligation being tested further reduce the fair
market value of the interest in real property in proportion to the liens with
similar priority.302 The computation of fair market value required by these
rules could cause many second-lien mortgages (and primary mortgages for
that matter) to fail to satisfy the 80% test. Inflated appraisals were common
in years leading up to the financial crisis,303 and will thus cause many
mortgages to fail the 80% test.
An example illustrates how senior liens can cause many second
and other subordinate liens to fail the 80% test. Say the originator of an
obligation treats an appraised value of $250,000 as the fair market value of
a house. Based upon that appraisal, the originator lends a buyer $200,000
secured by a first-lien mortgage on the house and $37,500 secured by a
second-lien mortgage on the house (the borrower paid the remaining
$12,500 of the purchase price).304 The appraised fair market value suggests
that both the first and the second mortgages satisfy the 80% test. Applying
the test to the first mortgage, the fair market value of the house would be
the full $250,000. The VTL ratio of the first mortgage is the $250,000
appraised value divided by the $200,000 mortgage or 125%, which is
greater than the required 80%, thus allowing the first-lien mortgage to
satisfy the 80% test. The fair market value apportioned to the second-lien
mortgage for purposes of the 80% test is $50,000 ($250,000 total fair
market value minus the $200,000 first mortgage). The VTL ratio for the
second mortgage is 133% ($50,000 fair market value to $37,500 loan).
Because 133% is greater than the required 80%, the second mortgage also
satisfies the 80% test.
If appraisers overstated the values of homes in this example, and
the $250,000 house is only worth $225,000 (just 90% of the appraised
value) at the time the buyer borrowed the first or second mortgage,305 then
the actual value, not the inflated appraised value, is appropriate for the 80%
test.306 Using the actual value of the collateral, the first-lien mortgage still

301. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(2).
302. See id.
303. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
304. The issuance of a first and second mortgage to home purchasers was typical during
the period leading up to the economic meltdown in 2008. See Vikas Bajaj, Equity Loans as
Next Round in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/27loan.html?pagewanted=print (noting the
higher risk of loss in second liens).
305. The $250,000 appraised value represents approximately 11% overstated value
($25,000 ÷ $225,000). Such inflation was not uncommon leading up to the financial crisis.
See supra Part II.B.2.a.
306. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i) (referring to fair market value of the collateral).
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satisfies the 80% test because it uses the full $225,000 actual fair market
value, which exceeds the $200,000 first mortgage. The VTL ratio for the
first mortgage is 112.5% ($225,000 value divided by the $200,000 loan).
The value for purposes of the second mortgage, however, is $225,000
minus the $200,000 first-lien mortgage, or $25,000. The VTL ratio for the
$37,500 second mortgage using that $25,000 value is 67% ($25,000 value
divided by the $37,500 loan). Because the 67% VTL ratio of the secondlien mortgage is less than the required 80% VTL ratio, the second-lien
mortgage does not satisfy the 80% test.
Studies of mortgages suggest that more than a significant
percentage of second-lien mortgage loans would not satisfy the 80% test.307

307. It was not uncommon for homebuyers to borrow close to 100% of the appraised
value of the home. See Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment
and the Mortgage Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 529, 541-542 (2011). For example, a borrower might take a first mortgage for 80%
of the appraised value of the home and a second mortgage for 20% of the appraised value of
the home (an 80-20 financing). Assuming the first mortgage was 80% of the value of the
home and a second mortgage was 20% of the value of the home with such arrangements, a
4.001% discrepancy between the appraised value and the actual value would cause the
second mortgage to fail the 80% test. For instance, if the appraised value of a home was
$100,000, the second mortgage would be for $20,000. The VTL ratio of the second home
would be less than 80% if the actual value of the home was only $95,999 instead of the
appraised $100,000. If the actual value were $95,999, to value assigned to the $20,000
second mortgage for the purpose of the 80% test would be $15,999 ($95,999 total actual
value minus the $80,000 first mortgage). The VTL ratio of the second mortgage in such a
situation would be 79.995% ($15,999 value to $20,000 loan). These calculations suggest
that if the appraised value was just 4.2% greater than the actual value ($4,001 ÷ $95,999),
the second mortgage on a 100%-financed home would not satisfy the 80% test. Based upon
reports that appraised values were often at least 20% greater than the actual value of the
homes, many mortgages would fail to satisfy the 80% test. See, e.g., Griffin & Maturana,
supra note 3 (finding that appraisal overstatements of at least 20% occurred in 14.5% of
studied loans).
Instead of being an 80-20 arrangement, the arrangement could have been an 80-1010 arrangement with a first mortgage equal to 80% of the home’s appraised value and a
second and third mortgage each equal to 10% of the home’s appraised value. If the first and
second mortgage had priority over the third, the third mortgage would not satisfy the 80% if
the actual value was only 2.01% less than the appraised value. To illustrate, a homebuyer
would borrow $100,000 to purchase a home with an appraised value of $100,000. The third
mortgage in an 80-10-10 arrangement would be $10,000. The third mortgage would not
satisfy the 80% test if the value of the property were less than $98,000 because the actual
value assigned to the third mortgage would be the $97,999 (for example) actual value minus
the $90,000 total amount of the first and second mortgages, which would make the VTL
ratio for the third mortgage less than 80% (e.g., $7,999 actual to a $10,000 loan is a only
79.99% VTL ratio).
If the mortgages in an 80-20 or 90-10-10 had equal priority, the actual value of the
property would have to be less than 80% of the appraised value for any mortgage to fail the
80% test. For instance, the value assigned to the 80% loan in a $100,000 80-20 arrangement
would be 80% of the actual value of the property, and the value assigned to the 20% loan
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A study examining combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios of pooled
mortgages indicates that many loans held by RMBS trusts may not satisfy
the 80% test.308 The CLTV ratio compares the combined principal balance
of all liens on the mortgaged property to the value of the mortgaged
property.309 Because LTV is the inverse of the VTL ratio, a VTL ratio of
80% equals an LTV ratio of 125%.310 Take for example a property with an
$80,000 fair market value that secures a $100,000 loan. The VTL ratio for
that property and obligation is 80% ($80,000 value divided by the $100,000
loan). The LTV ratio for that property and obligation is 125% ($100,000
loan divided by the $80,000 value). If the VTL ratio of a property and
obligation is less than 80%, the obligation will not satisfy the 80% test.
Inversely, if the LTV of a property is greater than 125%, the obligation
secured by the property will not satisfy the 80% test.
The CLTV ratio includes all mortgages secured by a piece of
property, but it does not provide information with respect to individual
loans.311 A study found that the CLTV ratio was greater than 100% for as
many as 34% of the loans in one RMBS trust.312 A CLTV of greater than
100% suggests that any second-lien mortgages in the pool may not satisfy
the 80% test. In the example above, if the house secured a $200,000 firstlien mortgage and a $37,500 second-lien mortgage, the combined loans
would be $237,500. If the value of the house were $250,000, the CLTV
ratio for the property and obligations would be about 95% ($237,500 loan
divided by $250,000 value). The VTL ratio of the aggregate loans would
be about 91% ($250,000 value divided by the $237,500 loan). If, however,
the value of the property were only $225,000, the CLTV ratio would be
about 106% ($237,500 loan divided by $225,000 value). The VLT ratio of
the aggregate loans would be about 95% ($225,000 value divided by the

would be 20% of the value of the property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(2). If the actual
value of the property were $90,000 (90% of the appraised value), $72,000 of it would be
assigned to the 80% loan, which would have been for $80,000, so the VTL ration would be
90% ($72,000 of value to $80,000 of mortgage). The VTL ratio for the $20,000 second
mortgage would also be 90% because $18,000 (20% of $90,000) of the value would be
assigned to it.
A diversified mortgage pool that has a ratio of first and subsequent mortgages that
equals the ratio of such mortgages to the value of appraised property would most likely have
more than a de minimis amount of mortgages that fail the 80% test.
308. Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28 (describing a study on
CLTV ratios of pooled mortgages).
309. See id. at 26 (explaining the meaning and application of the CLTV ration).
310. See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 F.R. 61293, T.D. 8458 (Dec.
24, 1992).
311. The CLTV ratio would also consider third mortgages and any other mortgages
secured by the property.
312. See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28.
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$237,000 loan). Nonetheless, the loan-by-loan analysis shows that some
loans may not satisfy the 80% test.
Because each loan is subject to the 80% test, a CLTV ratio of
greater than 100% signals that one or more of the loans secured by the
property may fail the 80% test. Failure will often result because the fair
market value of the property apportioned to the first-lien mortgage leaves a
disproportionately small amount of the property value to apportion to the
other mortgages. If the first mortgage is for $200,000 (roughly 84% of the
total amount of loans) and the actual value of the property is only
$225,000, the first-lien mortgage is almost 89% of the actual value of the
property. Thus, only 11% of the value of the property is apportioned to the
second-lien mortgage under the 80% test. The disproportionately small
amount of value assigned to the second-lien mortgage gives it a 150% LTV
ratio ($37,500 loan divided by the $25,000 value) and a 67% VTL ratio
($25,000 value divided by the $37,500 loan). The second-lien mortgage
thus does not satisfy the 80% test. In fact, loans with lower priority that are
part of a CLTV ratio that exceeds 100% will often fail the 80% test.313
The study of CLTV ratios demonstrates that as many as 34% of
randomly selected loans have CLTV ratios of greater than 100%.314 The
number of loans in an RMBS trust of second-lien mortgages with LTV
ratios of greater than 100% would most likely be even higher, and that fact
does not bode well for REMIC classification if a trust holds $100,000,000
of loans, and the CLTV ratio for 34% of the loans (based upon actual
value) is greater than 100%. With respect to $34,000,000 or 34% of the
loans, a question arises about whether some of them fail the 80% test. If
$5,100,000, or 15% of the loans (based upon actual value), in that group
are second-lien mortgages, and if half of those loans fail the 80% test,
$2,550,000 or 2.55% of the loans in the portfolio would fail the 80% test.
The percentage of mortgage notes that fail the 80% test would be even
greater for RMBS trusts that hold only second-lien mortgage notes.
As stated above, originators pressured appraisers to inflate values
80% of the time.315 That practice suggests that the value of collateral could
have been overstated for at least 80% of the second-lien loans. Because the
effect of overstated value of the collateral is magnified with respect to

313. See supra text accompanying note 307 (applying the 80% test to arrangements with
a single property securing multiple loans). As illustrated in that discussion, the structure of
the arrangement will often influence the effect of the 80% test. If all loans secured by a
piece of property have equal priority, the CLTV ratio would have to be greater than 125%
for any of the loans to fail the 80% test. If one or more loans have priority over other loans,
a CLTV ratio of greater than 100% signals that one more of the loans probably does not
satisfy the 80% test.
314. See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28.
315. See supra pp. Part II.B.2.a..
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second-lien mortgages, as many as 80% of the second-lien mortgages could
have VTL ratios lower than 80%. If that is the case, the vast majority of
second-lien mortgages granted in the years leading up to the financial crisis
will not pass the 80% test. Such loans would be principally secured only if
they pass the alternative test or come within the principally-secured safe
harbor.
b.

The Alternative Test

An obligation that does not satisfy the 80% test will nonetheless be
principally secured by an interest in real property if the obligation satisfies
the alternative test. An obligation must meet two requirements to satisfy
the alternative test.316 First, substantially all of the proceeds of the
obligation must be used by the borrower to acquire, improve, or protect an
interest in real property.317 Second, at the origination date, the only security
for the obligation can be the property that the borrower acquired, improved,
and protected with the loan proceeds.318 The test covers real estate
construction or acquisition loans for property not appraised at the time of
the loan.319
The language in the preamble to the regulations raises the question
of whether a loan for appraised property can satisfy the alternative test if it
fails the 80% test. That language provides:
[A] home improvement loan made in accordance with Title I of
the National Housing Act would be considered to satisfy the
principally secured standard even though one cannot readily
demonstrate that the loan satisfied the 80-percent test because a
property appraisal was not required at the time the loan was
originated.320
This language suggests that the alternative test only applies to loans that do
not require an appraisal of the collateral, and is not a fall-back test for loans
that fail the 80% test based on an inaccurate property value. However, if
the collateral is appraised, the 80% test would be the proper test. Thus, any
loan that includes an appraisal value of the property and fails the 80% test
probably cannot rely upon the alternative test.

316. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(ii).
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 169, at 459.
320. See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 C.F.R. 61293, 61294, T.D.
8458 (Dec. 24, 1992) (explaining how a home improvement loan can still satisfy the 80
percent test).
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Many loans issued before the financial crisis will not satisfy the
alternative test. During that period, many borrowers used proceeds from
home equity loans for purposes other than acquiring, improving, and
protecting interests in real property. Estimates indicate that as many as
40% of loans issued during years before the financial crisis were home
equity loans that were not used to acquire, improve, or protect real
property.321 These home equity loans would not satisfy the first part of the
alternative test. Borrowers often took a portion of a loan originated at the
time of purchase in cash.322 If the amount of cash that the borrower
received (or used for purposes other than to acquire, improve, or protect the
real property) caused the portion of the loan used to acquire, improve, or
protect the property to be less than substantial, the loan would not satisfy
the alternative test.
A loan will also fail the alternative test if property other than the
real property that the borrower acquired, improved, or protected with the
loan proceeds secures the loan. A borrower’s personal liability for the
obligation does not violate this rule of the alternative test.323 If the
borrower offers other property as collateral, however, the loan would not
satisfy the second requirement. Determining whether loans are secured by
other property requires an examination of each loan. Even without that
examination, many second-lien mortgage notes in RMBS trusts will fail the
alternative test because borrowers used the proceeds for purposes other
than acquiring, improving, or protecting the property.324 The borrowers
also obtained appraisals (albeit inaccurate appraisals) for the property,
suggesting the alternative test probably should not apply. Consequently,

321. See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and
the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis (Research Paper, May 21, 2010), at 19, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397607:
[O]ur findings are suggestive that a large fraction of home equity-based
borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement. This conclusion is
consistent with survey evidence by Brady, Canner, and Maki (2000) who find
that from 1998 to 1999, 40% of households cite home improvement as a reason
for home equity extraction, and 39% cite consumer expenditures.
322. See Hui Chen et al., Houses as ATMs? Mortgage Refinancing and Macroeconomic
Uncertainty 2 (Working Paper, 2012), at 4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024392
(“[O]n average about 70% of refinanced loans involve cash-out, and U.S. households
extracted over $1.7 trillion of home equity via refinancing from 1993 to 2010, corresponding
to 11.5% of new loan balances.”).
323. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(ii) (stating that to meet requirements of the
alternative test, the borrower must use the loan to acquire, improve, or protect specifically
real property).
324. See Chen et al., supra note 322 (demonstrating that borrowers are not using loans
in accordance with standards of alternative test and giving estimates how frequently this
occurs).
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with respect to many second-lien mortgage notes, the mortgage notes will
not satisfy the alternative test.
c.

The Reasonable-Belief Safe Harbor

Obligations that fail both the 80% test and the alternative test will
nonetheless be principally secured by an interest in real property if they
come within the reasonable-belief safe harbor. The reasonable-belief safe
harbor treats an obligation as being principally secured by an interest in
real property if, at the time the sponsor contributes the obligation to a
REMIC, the sponsor reasonably believes the obligation satisfies the 80%
test or the alternative test.325 A sponsor may base reasonable belief on
representations and warranties made by the originator.326 Alternatively, a
sponsor may base a reasonable belief on evidence indicating that the
originator typically made mortgages in accordance with an established set
of parameters, and that any mortgage loan originated in accordance with
those parameters would satisfy the 80% test or the alternative test.327 This
safe harbor does not apply if the sponsor actually knew, or had reason to
know, that an obligation failed both the 80% test and the alternative test.328
Thus, in addition to showing reasonable belief, the sponsor must be able to
show lack of actual knowledge and lack of reason to know that an
obligation does not meet one of the other tests for the obligation to qualify
for safe harbor protection.
Sponsors’ only hope to come within the reasonable-belief safe
harbor is to demonstrate that they based their reasonable belief on
representations and warranties made by the originator. They could not
argue that they based their reasonable belief on evidence indicating
originators made mortgages in accordance with established parameters that
would satisfy the 80% test, because evidence at the time indicated that
originators abandoned underwriting guidelines and made loans that could
not satisfy the 80% test.329 Sponsors also knew, or had reason to know, that
the loans they were securitizing could not pass the 80% test. In the years
leading up to the financial crisis, sponsors acknowledged the low quality of
the mortgages that they were securitizing.330 Nonetheless, they continued
to put them into RMBS trusts.331

325. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(i).
326. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(ii)(A) (affirming that a sponsor’s reasonable
belief can be founded on representations or warranties made by the originator).
327. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(ii)(B).
328. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(i).
329. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
330. See Bajaj, supra note 106 (illustrating that the sponsors were aware of their subpar
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Even where sponsors can prove a reasonable belief that mortgage
notes satisfied the 80% or alternative test, if a purported REMIC later
discovers that an obligation is not principally secured by an interest in real
property, the obligation is defective, and loses qualified mortgage status
within ninety days of the discovery date.332 The rules give sponsors those
ninety days to cure defective loans.333
Sponsors knew that they were transferring defective loans into
RMBS trusts at the time they formed the trusts. They also knew that
default rates of loans from particular originators were particularly high, but
they continued to accept loans from those originators.334 They were aware
that appraisers were overstating the value of homes,335 so they knew that
many loans could not satisfy the 80% test. Members of the industry had to
know these things before reporters became aware that the mortgages and
notes had serious quality problems. Even though REMICs have the
opportunity to cure defective obligations within the ninety-day window,336
nothing suggests that they took the steps necessary to cure defective
obligations. Due to the collapse of the residential real estate market as a
result of the practices of RMBS sponsors, insufficient mortgages existed to
replace defective obligations that the RMBS trusts held. Sponsors colluded
with originators to settle repurchase obligations instead of exercising trusts’
rights to cure defects by replacing defective obligations with compliant
loans.337 No cure alternative would appear to help RMBS trusts principally
secure their mortgage notes. Many second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts will
also fail to principally secure their mortgage notes.
3.

Secured By Real Property

In addition to being principally secured, an obligation held by an
RMBS trust must be secured by an interest in real property in order to

practices and mentioning the sponsors’ willingness to shift the blame to their investors).
331. See Bajaj, supra note 106 (demonstrating that sponsors securitized low quality
mortgages by using Ownit as an example).
332. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(iii).
333. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 137-140 (citing specific examples of sponsors
recognizing the consistent poor quality of certain originators, yet continuing to work with
them).
335. See Bajaj, supra note 124.
336. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2).
337. See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28 (alleging that
sponsors were colluding with originators by using the quality control process to benefit
originators).
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come within the definition of qualified mortgage.338 The regulations do not
define “secured by,” but they provide a list of instruments that are secured
by interests in real property. Those instruments include mortgages; deeds
of trust; installment land contracts; mortgage pass-thru certificates
guaranteed by GNMA, FNMA, FHLMC, or CMHC; other investment trust
interests; and obligations secured by manufactured housing.339 Of those
instruments, mortgages and deeds of trust would most often be the type of
security applicable to an obligation held by an RMBS trust. Practices of
the mortgage securitization industry in the years leading up to the financial
crisis in general, and the use of MERS in particular, suggest that RMBS
trusts often did not hold mortgages or deeds of trust. It also suggests that
the mortgage securitization industry lacked the power to enforce them.
In downstream litigation, courts in many states have considered
who holds or controls the legal rights and obligations of mortgage notes
and mortgages that are designated as RMBS trust property.340 The issues
state courts have considered with respect to mortgage notes and mortgages
include standing to foreclose,341 entitlement to notice of bankruptcy
proceeding against a mortgagor,342 ownership of a mortgage note under a
state’s commercial code, the right to initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure, and
liability for recording fees.343 The outcomes of these cases vary from
338. See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (defining qualified mortgage as an obligation secured
by an interest in real property).
339. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(5).
340. Litigation in this area is moving quickly, so even work done a few years ago is not
up to date. Nonetheless, an early article with a nice overview of cases that consider statelaw issues associated with MERS recording is John R. Hooge & Laurie Williams, Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.: A Survey of Cases Discussing MERS’ Authority to
Act, 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR 1, 1-21 (Aug. 2010) .
341. See Ralph v. Met Life Home Loans, No. CV 2010-0200 (5th D. Idaho Aug. 10,
2011) (holding that MERS was not the beneficial owner of a deed of trust, so its assignment
was a nullity and the assignee could not bring a nonjudicial foreclosure against the
borrower); Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 462 Mass. 569 (Mass. 2012) (holding that the
definition of a mortgagee in state statutes governing foreclosure by sale refers to the person
or entity holding the mortgage); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d
487 (Minn. 2009) (holding that MERS, as nominee, could institute a foreclosure by
advertisement, i.e., a nonjudicial foreclosure, based upon Minnesota “MERS statute” that
allows nominee to foreclose); Fowler v. Recontrust Co., N.A., 2011 WL 839863 (D. Utah
March 10, 2011) (holding that MERS is the beneficial owner under Utah law); Bain v.
Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) (holding that MERS was not a
beneficiary under Washington Deed of Trust Act because it did not hold the mortgage note).
342. See Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009) (holding that MERS
had no interest in the property and was not entitled to notice of bankruptcy or to intervene to
challenge it).
343. See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 624 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding that bank was not
considered a holder that could enforce debtor’s promissory note under New Jersey’s
Uniform Commercial Code).
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many cases pit a borrower against one or more
banks or MERS. Courts often rule in favor of the borrower, eliminating the
rights of the bank to collect on a note or foreclose on property; in other
cases, courts have found that banks have standing.344
The outcomes of such cases often turn on whether the bank
initiating a claim (or on whose behalf another party initiates a claim) holds
both the mortgage note and the mortgage at the initiation of the claim.345 In
some jurisdictions, courts allow banks to foreclose so long as they are the
mortgagees; other jurisdictions require banks to have the note to initiate
foreclosure.346 Banks in every jurisdiction can obtain rights to foreclosure
through possession of the necessary documents. Because timing of their
rights is important for REMIC classification, obtaining those rights before
initiating legal proceedings may not be sufficient for tax purposes.
The inability to foreclose on an obligation calls into question
whether the obligation was secured by real property. REMICs, sponsors,
originators, underwriters, and their advisors were put on notice as early as
2001 that their security positions probably lacked legal support. In 2001,
the Attorney General of New York concluded that recording a MERS
instrument violates New York real property law.347 Even though the New
York Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York State) later ruled
that the clerk had to record the MERS documents,348 that ruling put RMBS
trustees and other industry participants on notice that purported REMICs
may not be able to foreclose on mortgage notes that were part of a MERS
securitization.
Some commentators claim that an obligation is secured by an
interest in real property if, after all of the agreements and rights have been
enforced, the RMBS trust ends up with the collateral real property or the
proceeds from the sale of that property (the ultimate-outcome argument).349
They argue that an originator can transfer possession of a mortgage note
and assign the mortgage to the purported REMIC before it attempts to
344. See, Ebube Okoli, Bankruptcy Court Rules MERS Has Standing and the Customary
Rights of a Mortgagee and May Act Under the Mortgage , REFINBLOG.COM (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.refinblog.com (indicating that of the cases analyzed through Mar. 11, 2014,
courts held that MERS or the Bank had standing in 223 and lacked standing in 63, meaning
that in more than 20% of cases, bank could not foreclose or collect on the note).
345. See Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss & William KeAupuni Akina, Show Me the
Note!, 19 BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 3 (June 3, 2013) (reviewing cases where party
initiating foreclosure did not hold mortgage note at commencement of foreclosure).
346. See generally Whitman & Milner, supra note 246 (commenting on the various
requirements to initiate a foreclosure in different jurisdictions).
347. See MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006) (responding to
claim that a MERS instrument cannot be recorded under New York law).
348. See id. at 96.
349. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 169, at 464–65.
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enforce the mortgage note through payment collection efforts or
foreclosure.350 Courts typically find in favor of a bank that holds the
mortgage note and the mortgage prior to commencing a foreclosure action,
but the outcome is much less predictable if the bank does not hold both
instruments when the action commences.351 Thus, the possession of the
note and ownership of the mortgage often affect the rights of an RMBS
trust.
The ultimate-outcome argument does not hold up under scrutiny.
The REMIC rules provide that an obligation is not principally secured by
an interest in real property if the obligation’s security is an interest in
another obligation.352 The fact that a collateral obligation is secured by an
interest in real property does not affect this analysis.353 If an RMBS trust
holds an obligation from the originator and that obligation is secured by
mortgage notes that the originator holds, the RMBS trust’s obligation is not
principally secured by an interest in real property. This result holds true
even if interests in real property secure the originator’s mortgage notes.
Consequently, if an RMBS trust does not own mortgage notes for tax
purposes, but they own an obligation from the originator secured by the
mortgage notes, the obligation that the RMBS trust holds will not be
principally secured by an interest in real property. This result obtains even
though the RMBS trust may be able to foreclose on the originator’s
mortgage notes, gain ownership and possession of them and the mortgage,
and then foreclose on the underlying real estate. The ultimate outcome of
this series of events is the RMBS trust gaining the proceeds from the sale
of real property. However, the REMIC rules do not treat the RMBS trust
as holding an obligation secured by an interest in real property.
If the ultimate-outcome argument is not effective with respect to
obligations secured by interests in real property, it should not be effective
with respect to other obligations that require similar foreclosure actions.
On this rationale, the ultimate-outcome argument should not apply to
obligations that an RMBS trust cannot foreclose upon immediately. If an
RMBS trust must take action to compel an originator to transfer a mortgage
note and mortgage in order to foreclose on property, the RMBS trust does
not own an obligation principally secured by an interest in real property.
The state of affairs leading up to the financial crisis indicated that most
RMBS trusts could not foreclose on the homes securing their mortgage
notes without taking additional steps. Such steps would be similar to those

350. See id.
351. See generally Whitman & Milner, supra note 246 (noting the variation of outcomes
when the entity initiating the foreclosure does not hold the promissory note).
352. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(6).
353. See id.
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a person would take if he or she held an obligation secured by another
obligation that was secured by interests in real property. Consequently,
many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust,
probably did not hold obligations secured by real property.
The ability to timely foreclose is critical to the underlying purpose
of the REMIC rules. As stated above, the assets of a REMIC must remain
static to enable an accurate accounting of the REMIC’s interest income and
deductions.354 The inability to foreclose on the collateral of a loan impedes
the static-asset objective. If a REMIC can foreclose in a timely manner, it
can restore the cash flow from the defaulted loan with a new loan or other
eligible asset.355 If, however, the REMIC must go through numerous
additional steps to foreclose, it loses a source of cash flow for the period of
time it takes to complete those additional steps. That loss will affect the
computation of income and deduction related to the mortgage notes and
interests in the REMIC. Thus, the ability to foreclose immediately is at the
heart of the REMIC rules, and the ultimate-outcome argument undermines
a fundamental purpose of the rules. Consequently, courts and the IRS
should reject the ultimate-outcome argument.
The ultimate-outcome argument links to the timing requirement.
The relationship suggests that an obligation may be secured by an interest
in real property on the date of acquisition, even if the holder of the
obligation is unable to enforce the obligation or initiate foreclosure
proceedings at that time. In addition to ignoring the purposes of the
REMIC rules, this point of view disregards the timing requirement, which
generally requires the RMBS trust to hold the secured obligation on the
REMIC startup date, but no later than three months thereafter.356 The
inability to foreclose on a significant portion of the mortgage notes on the
startup date (or within three months after it) indicates that many mortgage
notes in RMBS trusts were not secured by interests in real property.
Because the securitization process using MERS was inadequate, this
problem probably applied equally to all types of RMBS trusts created in the
years leading up to the financial crisis.

354. See supra Part I.B.
355. See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(4) (2012) (permitting a “qualified replacement mortgage” to
be substituted for another obligation within three months of the startup day); Treas. Reg. §
1.860G-2(f)(2) (as amended in 2011).
356. See I.R.C. §§ 860D(a)(4), 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012) (stipulating the requirements for a
“qualified mortgage”).
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Timing Requirement

To satisfy the timing requirement, an RMBS trust must hold
qualified mortgages on a specific date keyed to the RMBS trust’s
formation. Generally, an obligation is a qualified mortgage only if: (1) the
RMBS trust is the tax owner of the obligation on the startup date; or (2)
within three months after the startup date, the RMBS trust purchases it.357
Furthermore, an RMBS trust comes within the definition of REMIC only if
it holds principally-secured obligations within three months after the
startup date.358 The description above of lending and securitization
practices reveals that RMBS trusts rarely had possession of mortgage notes
or were mortgagees of record within three months after the startup date,
much less on the startup date.359 The parties also probably failed to transfer
tax ownership to the RMBS trusts within that time period.360 Finally, until
an RMBS trust is mortgagee of record and has possession of the mortgage
note, it will be unable, in some jurisdictions, to foreclose on the real
property securing the mortgage notes,361 so its loans would not appear to be
principally secured by an interest in real property within the required time
period. Thus, even if an RMBS trust takes some steps to cure defects in the
securitization process after the three-month period expires, such efforts
probably would not result in the RMBS trust owning an obligation that was
principally secured by an interest in real property within the required time
period. The failure to own an obligation principally secured by real
property within the required time period will cause many RMBS trusts to
fail the timing requirement. The failure would be equally applicable to a
trust with second-lien mortgages.
D.

Substantially-All Requirement

A trust satisfies the substantially-all requirement only if no more
than a de minimis amount of the trust’s assets are prohibited assets (i.e.,
assets that are not qualified mortgages or permitted investments).362 A
regulatory safe harbor provides that an RMBS trust satisfies the
substantially-all test if the aggregate basis of the prohibited assets is no

357. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012).
358. I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2012).
359. See supra Part I.B-C.
360. See supra Part II.A.
361. See REFINBLOG, supra note 4.
362. Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1992). This article uses “prohibited
asset” to refer to any asset that is not a qualified mortgage or permitted investment.
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greater than 1% of the aggregate basis of all of the trust’s assets.363 If the
aggregate basis of the prohibited assets exceeds the 1% threshold, the trust
may nonetheless be able to demonstrate that it owns no more than a de
minimis amount of prohibited assets.364 The regulations neither provide
guidance regarding what a trust must do to demonstrate it owns less than a
de minimis amount of prohibited assets nor do they provide a percentage
beyond which the amount of prohibited assets would cease to be de
minimis. Nonetheless, with the 1% safe harbor and the overall tax
accounting reasons for granting special tax treatment to REMICs,365 a de
minimis amount of prohibited assets surely cannot exceed a small
percentage of an RMBS trust’s total assets. This article illustrates that a
significant percentage of the assets of perhaps most RMBS trusts would not
come within the definition of qualified mortgage, so perhaps most RMBS
trusts formed in the years leading up to the financial crisis would have a
difficult time meeting the substantially-all requirement. The hypothetical
second-lien RMBS trust would almost certainly fail the substantially-all
requirement test.
One might argue that if an RMBS trust is not the tax owner of a
mortgage note, the basis of the note reduces both the numerator and the
denominator for purposes of applying the substantially-all requirement.
This theory is unfounded because it does not account for the trust owning
some sort of asset. Even if an RMBS trust’s assets are not qualified
mortgages, an RMBS trust still holds some type of asset. If an RMBS trust
does not own qualified mortgages, the nature of the asset it does in fact
own will likely depend upon the reason the asset fails to be a qualified
mortgage. The discussion above illustrates that even if an RMBS trust does
not hold qualified mortgages, it could hold a loan from an originator or
sponsor. Consequently, for purposes of determining the portion of the
trust’s assets that are prohibited assets, these reclassified assets would be a
part of both the numerator and denominator. If they are much greater than
1% of the trust’s total assets, the trust will likely not come within the
definition of a REMIC. In many situations, reclassified assets appear to be
a significant portion of the trust’s total holdings.
For example: if an RMBS trust owns $50,000,000 in assets, but
because of a failed securitization it is the tax owner of only $35,000,000 of
mortgage notes. The $15,000,000 balance of its assets could be an
obligation from an originator. The numerator, for purposes of applying the
substantially-all requirement, would be the $15,000,000 obligation from the
originator, and the denominator would include all $50,000,000 of the

363. Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1992).
364. Id.
365. See supra Part II.B (setting forth accounting requirements for REMICs).
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trust’s assets. The percentage of prohibited assets would thus be 30%
($15,000,000 divided by $50,000,000). This computation does not exclude
the $15,000,000 that results from the trust’s failure to be the tax owner of
the mortgage notes.
The discussion to this point has reviewed the state of affairs in the
RMBS industry in the years leading up to the financial crisis. It also
demonstrates that many RMBS trusts most likely failed to satisfy the
REMIC requirements and provided the legal basis for challenging REMIC
classification. Some RMBS trusts would have an almost impossible chance
of convincing a court that they satisfied the requirements of the REMIC
rules. Thus, this Article has presented the legal reasons for challenging the
REMIC classification of numerous RMBS trusts. The next part of this
Article presents the policy reasons for challenging the REMIC
classification of many RMBS trusts.
III. POLICY REASONS TO ENFORCE REMIC RULES
At present, the IRS is probably not auditing REMICs or enforcing
the REMIC rules. Perhaps its reason for not challenging REMIC status at
this time is that it is studying the issues, observing the outcome of the
numerous actions against RMBS trusts, sponsors, and originators, and
gathering better information to choose the appropriate trusts to challenge.
If the IRS fails to act, private parties will eventually instigate qui tam or
whistleblower actions that serve the same policy reasons that should
compel IRS action. Because REMICs did not file the correct returns and
may have committed fraud, the statute of limitations for earlier years
should remain open indefinitely,366 giving the IRS and other parties
adequate time to pursue REMIC litigation after obtaining the necessary
information. Ultimately, the IRS should take action against these parties.
Failure to do so deprives the government of significant tax revenue, tacitly
sanctions illegal behavior, cedes control of tax enforcement decisionmaking to private industry, disregards Congressional mandate, and relieves
the tax bar of its obligation to help protect the tax system and prudently
counsel RMBS sponsors and trustees.
The private-label RMBS industry is huge. At its peak in 2007, it
held $2.2 trillion in outstanding securities.367 Large amounts of interest
366. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(2) (2012) (providing that the statute of limitations remains
open indefinitely if a return is fraudulent); I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (2012) (providing that the
statute of limitations remains open indefinitely if no return is filed). But see I.R.C. §
6501(g)(1) (2012) (providing that the statute of limitations does not remain open indefinitely
if a tax corporation, in good faith, files a trust return).
367. Matthew Goldstein, The Amazing Shrinking Pile of Non-Agency Mortgage Debt,
REUTERS, Mar. 8, 2013, available at
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payments are likely to change hands on $2.2 trillion of RMBS. At just 4%,
the annual interest alone would be $88 billion. REMIC rules ensure that
RMBS investors and RMBS trustees properly account for that interest and
pay tax on it. RMBS sponsors’ failure to properly create REMICs caused
them to be unable to account for interest inflow and interest outflow. As a
consequence, they most likely failed to report income due to the federal
government, depriving it of billions of dollars of tax revenue.
By overstating the value of mortgage notes, the parties to RMBS
trusts understated the interest rates on those notes. Because of the lack of
sufficient collateral securing a mortgage note and borrowers’ lack of
qualification, mortgage notes were worth much less than their stated value.
Consequently, the stated interest of the note would be much less than the
actual interest. For example, if the face value of a mortgage note was
$100,000 and the stated interest was 5%, the borrower would pay $5,000 of
interest on the note. If, however, the actual value of the mortgage note was
$80,000, the $5,000 payment would represent a 6.25% interest rate. A
RMBS trust that reported interest income using the 5% rate would
underreport income. Therefore, if the interest deductions were otherwise
appropriate, the RMBS trust would understate its taxable income.
Additionally, the inability to maintain a static asset pool with the types of
assets entering RMBS trusts and their poor quality would result in a
miscalculation of phantom income, further depriving the government of tax
revenues.368
The IRS’s lack of enforcement in this area prior to the financial
crisis contributed to the magnitude of the crash.369 If the IRS had audited
RMBS trusts, it would have recognized the inadequacies of the
securitization process, the poor quality of mortgage notes being securitized,
and the lack of effort to cure defective mortgage notes. Enforcement would
have presented RMBS sponsors not only with the prospect of losing
favorable tax classification for multiple-tranche RMBS products, but also
would have threatened to expose their misdeeds to unsuspecting investors.
Exposure would have ended the demand for shoddy RMBS products,
which potentially would have placed sufficient market pressure on RMBS
organizers and loan originators to clean up their acts. Thus, the IRS could
have helped deter the financial crisis. Its continued failure to enforce

http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2013/03/08/the-amazing-shrinking-pile-of-nonagency-mortgage-debt/.
368. See supra text accompanying note 44 (explaining the difficulties in correctly
calculating income for RMBS trusts).
369. See Bradley T. Borden, Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradley-t-borden/did-the-irs-causethe-fin_b_1972207.html (arguing that the IRS could have prevented the financial crisis by
more actively policing REMICs).
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REMIC rules empowers RMBS organizers and loan originators to repeat
their actions using REMIC classification as a front for illegal action.
The IRS has been slow to enforce the REMIC rules and clean up
the RMBS industry. Instead, the actions it has taken have benefitted many
of the parties who caused the financial crisis. On December 6, 2007, the
IRS released Revenue Procedure 2007-72, which stated “it would not view
loan modifications specifically made under these guidelines [framework to
fend off foreclosure of subprime mortgages] as grounds to challenge the tax
benefits held by REMICS . . . .”370 In October 2009, the IRS provided
some flexibility for CRE loans held in a REMIC. This was later followed
by federal bank regulators encouraging lenders not to foreclose on
delinquent CRE borrowers because of the economic downturn.371 On
August 17, 2010, the IRS announced that it would not challenge the ability
of REMICs “to claim certain loans as ‘qualified mortgages’ even if they no
longer meet the specific requirements of such loans under tax code Section
860.”372 These IRS actions were not directed at the heart of the problem,
but rather appear to accommodate the parties who caused the financial
crisis.
At least one commentator worries that taxing REMICs will unduly
harm investors.373 The sponsors’ failure to adequately structure REMICs,
with no enforcement of the laws, has harmed investors. And sponsors’
failure to structure the arrangements to obtain favorable tax treatment also
harms the investors because the tax exposure reduces the value of the
REMIC interests. Investors should be able to recover that lost value from
the sponsors, so the tax burden, which represents revenue properly
belonging to U.S. taxpayers, should fall upon the wrongdoers who
organized these shams and misrepresented their quality to investors.
Furthermore, the IRS may be able to impose transferee liability on the
sponsors who transferred mortgage notes worth far less than the
consideration received and collect any taxes and penalties not covered by
the value of RMBS trusts’ assets.

370. Alison Bennett, IRS Reassures REMICs It Will Not Challenge Tax Status if
Subprime Loans Are Modified, 89 BBR 948 (Dec. 10, 2007).
371. Richard Cowden, Securitizers Gearing up from ‘CMBS 2.0’ In a Market Where
Demand Outstrips Supply, 3 REAL EST. L. & INDUS. REP. 474 (Jul. 13, 2010).
372. Mortgages in REMICs Under Section 860 Will Not Be Challenged, According to
IRS, 3 REAL EST. L. & INDUS. REP. 608 (Aug. 24, 2010).
373. See Victor Fleischer, Why a Tax Crackdown Is Not Needed on Mortgage-Backed
Securities, N. Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 25, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/why-a-tax-crackdown-is-not-needed-on-mortgagebacked-securities/?nl=business&emc=edit_dlbkpm_20121121 (arguing that taxing REMICs
would pass liability to investors who would sue various mortgage intermediaries and
“further gum[] up the market for mortgage-backed securities”).
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The IRS’s unwillingness to enforce the REMIC rules cedes control
to private industry, which is aware of and abuses its position of power. As
one commentator noted,
They take aggressive positions, and they figure that if enough of
them take an aggressive position, and there’s billions of dollars at
stake, then the IRS is kind of estopped from arguing with them
because so much would blow up. And that is called the Wall
Street Rule. That is literally the nickname for it.374
Industry experts who made rules as they went along now invoke
the Wall Street Rule. An author of the leading REMIC treatise is credited
with saying that “even if the IRS finds wrongdoing, it may be loath to act
because of the wide financial damage the penalties would cause.”375 Such
patent recognition of IRS impotence is frightening and threatens to
undermine not only the tax system but also the already tenuous ideal of
treating taxpayers equally. The IRS should not cede control to private
parties. If the IRS had audited in the years leading up to the financial
crisis, it could have prevented the problem in the first place and would not
have to take action now that could potentially cause financial damage.
If the concern is that enforcement at this time will cause wide
financial damage, this article should help alleviate that concern. The IRS
could focus on low-hanging fruit, such as second-lien mortgage RMBS
trusts that claimed to be REMICs. Second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts
formed in the years leading up to the financial crisis almost certainly will
not satisfy the REMIC requirements. Proving a case against them will be
very possible for the IRS. Also, second-lien mortgage RMBS issuances
were comparatively small, with about $60 billion in 2005.376 Financial
damage to the world economy will not result from challenging the tax
classification of second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts. The trusts will owe
taxes and penalties, and the parties will have to determine the ultimate
liability for those taxes and penalties. Under a transference liability theory,

374. Lee Sheppard, Bain Capital Tax Documents Draw Mixed Reaction, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED, (NPR Business broadcast Aug. 28, 2012) (discussing taxation of private
equity management compensation), available at
http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=160196045
&m=160201502.
375. See Scott J. Paltrow, IRS Weighs Tax Penalties on Mortgage Securities, REUTERS
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-usa-mbs-taxesidUSTRE73Q7UX20110427.
376. Second-Lien MBS Issuance up Sharply in 2005 Despite Slowdown in HELOC
Securitization, INSIDE MBS & ABS (Mar. 31, 2006),
http://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/issues/imfpubs_ima/2006_13/news/10000035011.html.
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that liability could rest with the RMBS sponsors or loan originators—the
parties most responsible for the financial crisis.
After pursuing second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts, the IRS could
evaluate the results and decide whether they should make a case with
respect to other types of RMBS trusts and pursue further action against
them. IRS enforcement, even with respect to a portion of the RMBS
market, will help the IRS develop further expertise in this area and enable it
to use the expertise to develop better audit and enforcement practices. The
IRS could use those improved skills to help prevent a catastrophe similar to
the one that caused the financial crisis. Enforcement would also reestablish
the IRS as the police power in this area and take back that function from
Wall Street. Finally, enforcement in this area would bring other viewpoints
and voices to lawmaking in this area.
The IRS’s inaction also damages the tax system in a more general
way. The tax bar traditionally has accepted some responsibility for
upholding the integrity of the tax system. Members of the bar do this by
ensuring that advice they give reflects the highest standards and that they
do not participate in transactions that violate the law. This article illustrates
that a significant percentage of RMBS trusts probably do not satisfy the
REMIC requirements, but RMBS organizers treated them as REMICs.
Some RMBS trusts appear to have almost no chance of satisfying the
requirements. Nonetheless, “will” tax opinion letters accompanied RMBS
offering materials. A will opinion is the authors’ assurance that the RMBS
trust has a 95% chance of prevailing on the merits should the IRS challenge
the classification.377 The authors of will opinions qualify them by
providing that they are reliable only if the securitization occurs as described
in the offering materials.378 Despite that qualifier, opinion authors should
be accountable for inaccurate opinions to the extent that they were aware of
the RMBS problems. As industry participants who were close to the
action, they probably knew about many of the problems that existed.379
Because of the Wall Street Rule and IRS inaction, they continued to issue
unsupported opinions. If the IRS does not enforce the REMIC rules,
members of the bar arguably will feel no greater obligation to abide by the
rules. Consequently, the IRS’s inaction causes exponential damage to the
tax system as a whole.

377. See Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAW. 301, 312 (Winter
2011) (stating that “will” opinion has no material chance of being wrong).
378. See id. at 367.
379. See Complaint, supra note 7, available at
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=4EP2AF38l3ql/
RHTZ6TMYQ==&system=prod (revealing that attorneys and accounting firms were aware
of the securitization deficiencies).
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Finally, IRS inaction is an affront to the law that grants favorable
tax treatment to only certain types of RMBS trusts. This offends many
commentators who believe that the IRS should not exercise such discretion
but should enforce the laws as created by Congress.380 Furthermore, the
detailed rules in the REMIC regime address specific purposes,381 and a
failure to enforce the rules undermines those purposes. Consequently,
significant policy supports the IRS challenging REMIC classification of at
least some RMBS trusts. If the IRS fails to take action, it must accept
responsibility for the resulting financial harm.
CONCLUSION
The issue of REMIC failure is important in at least four contexts:
(1) in any potential effort by the IRS to clean up the industry and collect tax
and penalties from organizations that did not satisfy the REMIC
requirements; (2) in civil lawsuits brought by REMIC investors against
sponsors, underwriters, and other parties who pooled mortgages and sold
mortgage-backed securities; (3) to state and federal prosecutors who may
consider bringing criminal or civil fraud claims against sponsors,
underwriters, and other parties who pooled mortgages and sold RMBS; and
(4) to private parties who know of specific abuse and may bring qui tam or
whistleblower action against purported REMICs. This article provides a
roadmap for pursuing tax enforcement action against RMBS trusts. It
illustrates that many RMBS trusts, perhaps the majority of them, formed in
the years leading up to the financial crisis could not satisfy the REMIC
requirements. Instead of advocating action against all such trusts, however,
the IRS should consider bringing action against RMBS trusts that fail to
satisfy the REMIC requirements. A logical starting point would therefore
be an examination of RMBS trusts comprised of second-lien mortgage
notes. Findings and results of such actions would inform the IRS about
whether it should expand the scope of its efforts. Both law and policy
support this action, so continued inaction is unacceptable.

380. See, e.g., Yves Smith, IRS Likely to Expand Mortgage Industry Coverup by
Whitewashing
REMIC
Violations,
NAKED CAPITALISM
(Apr.
28,
2011),
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/04/irs-likely-to-expand-mortgage-industry-coverupby-whitewashing-remic-violations.html#sdR8UXJzAHLIllVG.99 (arguing that the IRS
employs a “nothing to see here” strategy regarding widespread violations of REMICs rules
to avoid “blow[ing] up the mortgage industrial complex” and reigniting the financial crisis).
381. See supra Part I.

